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Abstract 
Rail safety is closely controlled, but there is less supervision of the actual road, its construction and 
condition. Safety is the responsibility of the road user, not the provider. This is a feature of the common 
law, including the rule that no liability attaches to road omissions, and of legislation governing road 
and rail. It has its roots in the many centuries of highway development.  New Zealand legislation has 
few safety duties for road owners, but very comprehensive and strict obligations for railways. This is 
also true internationally, except that in some jurisdictions there are enhanced controls on road. Health 
and safety laws may not cover the public safety aspects of roads, but they do cover all aspects of 
railways. The imbalance increases the cost and reduces the effectiveness of rail. Potential reforms of 
the law are proposed. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
I   Aim  
In New Zealand and other jurisdictions, rail safety is closely controlled, including the 
safety of the infrastructure - the track, formation, signalling and structures. For roads, 
on the other hand, there is much less supervision of the actual road, its construction 
and condition. Safety is the responsibility of the user, not the provider, except in 
general terms. For example, if a rock falls on a car and kills someone, then the road 
owner is unlikely to face civil or regulatory action.1 If the same event happened on 
rail, then at least regulatory action, involving penalties, is likely. 
Rail is an integrated infrastructure and operational business, predominantly 
handling freight, which in New Zealand is expected to be profitable, and so its 
performance is typically measured in financial terms. Road (as an infrastructure 
owner) is not measured as if it were a business, its costs are shared between trucks, 
buses and cars, and vehicle operation is not the road owner’s responsibility. When 
compared, rail is often at a disadvantage. Rail is often an “easy target” for criticism 
and regulatory action because of its concentrated ownership, integrated operation, and 
tradition of being safe, whereas road obligations are largely on the individual driver. 
The safety obligations of rail make it more expensive to run than road, which 
deserves recognition when the two are compared. Rail’s safety and environment 
advantages over road can been seen as of lesser consequence than its financial 
performance, making it harder to contribute to the economy in the way it should. This 
dissertation aims to help clarify, and potentially rectify, the imbalance between road 
and rail in terms of safety obligation. Making road and rail’s safety obligations match 
would give rail a greater chance of assisting the country’s ongoing development. 
The primary objective of the dissertation is thus to explore the difference in the 
safety treatment of road and rail in the law, directly and indirectly. A further objective 
is to show that the law places burdens on rail not shared by road, and a third objective 
is to propose potential reform.  
The main focus is the law that applies in New Zealand, but the case and statute law 
of other jurisdictions with a common legal heritage is examined to provide the context 
for the position here, and to see what they can teach us. The safety obligations covered 
are those arising from tort and nuisance liability, and legislative and regulatory 
obligations, for personal injury and property damage. General criminal and coroners’ 
                                                          
1 A real case, where the coroner could only exhort the New Zealand Transport Agency [NZTA] to pay 
more attention to such risks: Re Heather Joy Thompson, Coroners Court, Hamilton, CSU-2014-HAM-
000130, 25 September 2014, Coroner Ryan, at [24]. Contrast Lewis (Guardian ad litem of) v British 
Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1145; Just v British Columbia [1989] 2 SCR 1228.   
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jurisdictions are not covered, except to provide examples. The dissertation 
concentrates on the law; it is not the place to explore the financial and economic issues 
in any depth. 
The focus will be on road and rail’s functions as infrastructure owners, and the 
interaction of people and vehicles with the infrastructure, and not on vehicle operation 
itself. There are substantial differences between road and rail vehicle operation, 
making operations not directly comparable.  
II Context 
Road accidents are a serious safety problem in New Zealand. In 2014 there were 
8882 road accidents, killing 294 people and injuring 11,219.2 The number killed is 
much greater than those killed in rail-related incidents (nine),3 or in all work-related 
accidents (63).4 There are also over 226,000 work-related injury claims5 a year, across 
all employers, including 106 rail injuries6.  
New Zealand has stringent laws covering employment health and safety, the 
Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 (HSWA);7 and railway safety, the Railways Act 
2005 (RA). There are also substantial laws covering road user behaviour and vehicle 
condition, in the Land Transport Act 1998, regulations and rules. The HSWA and the 
RA cover rail accidents where the infrastructure was at fault through, for example poor 
design or maintenance, as well as where individuals were in the wrong. Road user laws 
cover accidents caused by drivers and vehicles, but there appears to be a dearth of laws 
covering the responsibilities of the road owner itself, for example for the condition of 
the road. 
A key theme is the distinction between the absence of liability in tort for non-
feasance, and liability for misfeasance, between inaction and action. This has been 
typically applied to roads, and not to rail. The dissertation will claim that even when 
the non-feasance rule is not explicitly applied, or where other changes have curtailed 
its effect (for example accident compensation legislation), the law continues to reflect 
the differential treatment. Even where statutory liability appears to be even handed, as 
with health and safety legislation, the practical application of that legislation may not 
be.  
                                                          
2 Ministry of Transport [MoT] <www.transport.govt.nz>. 
3 MoT, Rail Safety Statistics – Six monthly statistics for the period ended 30 June 2015, August 2015, 
at 14. There were no rail employee deaths.  
4 WorkSafe New Zealand <www.business.govt.nz/worksafe>; MoT <www.transport.govt.nz>; 
excludes work accidents on road. 
5 “Injury Statistics – Work-related Claims: 2014”, Statistics New Zealand <www.statistics.govt.nz>. 
6 MoT, above n 3, at 14. Most of the injuries were to employees (72). 
7 This dissertation is written as if the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 (including its amendments 
to the Railways Act 2005) was in force. It actually comes into force on 4 April 2016. 
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III Highway Authorities’ Control Over Their Roads 
The extent to which road owners have control of the use of their roads, and road users, 
is an important point in considering the liability issues discussed in the following 
chapters. This introduction concludes by assessing the level of control road owners do 
have.  
Road owners are typically seen as not having control over the users of roads, 
whereas a railway company has control over all its activities. Our road safety laws 
assume driver responsibility.8 Under this assumption, drivers need to be ready to deal 
with all issues on the road, not just their own behaviour or that of other drivers, but 
also deficiencies in the road. Road owners have limited, if any, liability. It is a standard 
international assumption.9  
This view overlooks the areas where road authorities do have substantial control, 
like the physical condition of roads, and also substantial influence, like in the setting 
of road use rules and parameters. Roading authorities have physical control over the 
sources of harm, and control gives them opportunities to create dangers that others do 
not have.10 As a Canadian case observed, “[t]he [roading authority] is in complete 
control of repair and maintenance and travellers are dependent upon [the authority] for 
reasonable performance of the work”. Users are in “no position to assess the … 
construction and maintenance work”.11  
Official road accident statistics indicate that roads do at least contribute to 
accidents. Police Traffic Crash Reports identify the causes of (or contributing factors 
to) every accident.12 These include aspects of road condition, such as slipperiness and 
poor markings, which are largely within the control of the road authority. In 2014, 
road factors contributed to 10 per cent of fatal crashes, and 11 per cent of injury 
crashes,13 similar to the previous nine years back to 2005.14   
But these figures are likely to underrepresent the accidents where the road 
authority had some control over the outcome. Road authorities also control other 
aspects of road use which may contribute to accidents. For example, they set speed 
limits on road sections, design and maintain signage, and create policies as to what 
sorts of vehicles can use the road and under what conditions, such as heavy vehicles. 
                                                          
8 Steven Penman, Criminal Cars: Attributing Liability for Crashes Caused by Autonomous Vehicles 
(LLM Thesis, University of Auckland, 2012), at 5, n 18. 
9 See the Convention on Road Traffic 1042 UNTS 17 (opened for signature 7 October 1968, entered 
into force 21 May 1977), arts 8 (5) and 13(1). New Zealand is not a signatory. 
10 Brodie v Singleton Shire Council [2001] HCA 29, (2001) 206 CLR 512 at [103] and [283]. 
11 Lewis above n 1, at [33]. 
12 MoT Motor Vehicle Crashes in New Zealand 2014, <www.transport.govt.nz>. 
13 MoT, above n 12, Figure 17. 
14 MoT, above n 12, report for the respective years, Figure 17. 
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In these respects the authorities exercise a substantial degree of control over the safety 
outcomes. And yet, just as for physical road condition, they are likely to face no 
sanction if they do it in a deficient way, or fail to do anything. 
There is recognition of the role of roads in contributing to road safety in the current 
official road safety policy, Safer Journeys. This “takes a Safe System approach to road 
safety that works across all elements of the road system — roads and roadsides, 
speeds, vehicles and road use”.15 “Safe roads and roadsides” is at the head of a list of 
12 key areas of concern. This extends the scope of safer roads to taking measures to 
prevent some road-user behaviour with serious consequences, such as loss of control, 
and intersection collisions. “Loss of control” is the single biggest factor contributing 
to road accidents, involved in 41 per cent of fatal and 28 per cent of injury accidents.16 
The strategy recognises that there are actions that road authorities could take to 
address these issues, such as median barriers, skid resistant surfaces, and more 
appropriate speed limits. It notes that “New Zealand’s roads are not as safe as those in 
other countries”.17 These actions are at least partly within the control of roading 
authorities. It also recognises that responsibility for road safety “is shared between the 
users and the system designers”. To achieve a safe system “[r]oad controlling 
authorities have to design, build, and maintain roads and to manage speeds to protect 
responsible road users”.18 Recognition is one step, but actual responsibility with 
appropriate sanctions is needed. There is no consideration given in Safer Journeys to 
making roading authorities legally responsible for the condition of their roads. 
On the other hand, rail safety law requires a safety case to be prepared which 
covers all these aspects. If it turns out that speed limits were improperly set or badly 
marked, then the rail organisation would be liable to prosecution, just as they would if 
failure to maintain its track or bridges caused an accident.19 
Roading authorities claim that they do not have enough money to cover all 
eventualities.20 That may be true, but their budgets are very large ($14b over the three 
years 2015-2018)21 and whether they have enough money to improve safety boils 
down to prioritisation. Priorities are set on a “value for money” criterion.22 This is 
defined by the New Zealand Transport Agency as “selecting the right things to do, 
                                                          
15 MoT Safer Journeys New Zealand’s Road Safety Strategy 2010–2020 (2010). 
16 MoT, above n 12, Figure 17. 
17 MoT, above n 15, at 14. 
18 At 10. 
19 See Chapter Three. 
20 NZTA “SH3 Mangaotaki South Fatal Rockfall – 28 March 2014”. Report to Coroner for Thompson, 
above n 1. 
21 NZTA National Land Transport Program 2015–2018 <www.nzta.govt.nz>.  
22 New Zealand Government Government Policy Statement on Land Transport 2015/16–2024/25, 
(December 2014), at [45] and [92]. 
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implementing them in the right way, at the right time and for the right price”,23 which 
is a weaker criterion than the cost element in the HSWA.24 Analysis of road safety 
improvements goes through the same process as any other roading expenditure, based 
on cost-benefit analysis, discounted at six per cent.25 There is no additional weighting 
for safety, so safety can be readily outweighed by cost. This is in contrast to the HSWA 
standard for rail, examined in Chapter Four. 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 NZTA <www.nzta.govt.nz>.  
24 See Chapter Four. 
25 NZTA Economic Evaluation Manual, (1st ed, revised Wellington, 2016) at 2-4, 2-14 and 2-18. 
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Chapter Two: Liability and the Non-feasance Rule 
I Current Status of the Rule 
Highway1 authorities have for centuries been protected against suit for failure to repair, 
the so-called non-feasance rule. Such a defence was not available to railways. The rule 
says that a highway authority is liable for misfeasance (action) but not for non-
feasance (inaction or omission). It can be traced back to the 15th century.2 This chapter 
charts its development, assesses its current importance, and draws out some themes. 
The rule has been a common law feature in the United Kingdom, Australia, and 
New Zealand. It is still applies in all three, despite attempts, some successful, to curtail 
it.3 In the United Kingdom it was “abrogated” by legislation in 19614, but later cases 
reduced the scope of the abrogation. In New Zealand it reached its zenith in the 1960s.5 
There was no action on a call for the abolition of the rule in New Zealand by an official 
committee,6 probably because the contemporaneous introduction of accident 
compensation7 reduced its practical impact, although it could conceivably still be 
invoked for property damage (such as to vehicles).  
In Australia the High Court sought to abolish the rule in Brodie v Singleton Shire 
Council in 2001.8 Concerns about the cost implications led to the case being 
effectively overturned by legislation, so that in all but two states and territories there 
is a specific legislative defence for inaction.9 
The rule thus still applies, albeit with curtailed effect in some jurisdictions. 
A Foundation Cases  
Russell v Men of Devon10 is usually cited as the modern source of the rule. A defective 
bridge caused damage to the plaintiff’s wagon, and the plaintiff sued for damages. The 
action was taken against the “Men of Devon”, an unincorporated and fluctuating 
                                                          
1 A highway is broadly defined; it includes bridges and footpaths: Highway Act 1835 (UK) 5 & 6 Will 
4 c 50, s 5 (still in force). 
2 AT D[enning] untitled note, (1939) 55 LQR 343. See Brodie v Singleton Shire Council [2001] HCA 
29, (2001) 206 CLR 512 at [72] and [117]. 
3 A House of Lords Select Committee recommended its abolition in 1939. Rees Jeffreys The King’s 
Highway (Batchworth, London, 1949) at 168. 
4 Highways (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1961 9 &10 Eliz II c 63, s 1.  
5 Hocking v Attorney-General [1963] NZLR 513 (CA); Smith v Attorney-General (Ministry of Works) 
(1968) 12 MCD 218 
6 Torts and Law Reform Committee The Exemption of Highway Authorities from Liability for Non-
Feasance, Report to Minister of Justice 1973, at 17; Email from PD McKenzie (member of the 
Committee) to Murray King regarding action on their recommendations (24 March 2014). 
7 Torts and Law Reform Committee, above n 6, at 16. 
8 Brodie, above n 2. 
9 See Section I D, below. 
10 Russell v Men of Devon (1788) 2 TR 667, 100 ER 359 (KB).  
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group. As a result of this fluidity, new and “innocent” residents might have been liable 
for damages they had no part in causing. If it were to be otherwise, then the county 
should have incorporated, by legislation.11 Moreover there was no mechanism for 
spreading the burden of damages beyond the persons named in the suit.12 The court 
agreed with the defendants that an action should not lie for neglect in not repairing the 
bridge. Allowing the action would “have been productive of an infinity of actions”.13  
Further mid 19th century cases developed the rule.14 M’Kinnon v Penson involved 
a fall off a dangerous bridge.15 Since Russell, legislation had been passed that enabled 
counties to be sued in the name of the surveyor (Penson), thus avoiding the difficulties 
identified in Russell.16 But this Act did not create a new liability for non-repair, just 
the same liability transferred, and so Russell stood. Furthermore, the only action that 
could be taken was by the Crown, to enforce the duty, and not by an individual for 
damages.17  
In Young v Davis18 the plaintiff fell into an unfilled, unguarded and unlit hole at 
the end of a footpath. The court followed M’Kinnon, but also said that while a parish 
could be compelled to repair, a traveller ought to be wary of faults and look out for 
himself. He should adjust his speed according to the conditions.19 The theme of user 
self-reliance persists today.20 
The misfeasance/non-feasance distinction was clarified and cemented in in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries. In Cowley v Newmarket Local Board,21 the House of 
Lords specifically endorsed Russell and regarded the law as settled. In a Nova Scotia 
appeal, the Privy Council held as “settled law” that a “transfer to a public corporation 
of the obligation to repair does not of itself render such corporation liable to an action 
in respect of a mere non-feasance”,22 in the absence of statutory language to the 
contrary. A new obligation imposed by statute was required for the rule to be avoided. 
In 1895 a further case came before the Privy Council, this time from New South 
Wales.23  In this case, no duty had been transferred, but equally there was no original 
duty in any statute to repair roads, and so no ability to sue for “mere non-repair”.  
                                                          
11 At 671. 
12 At 673. 
13 At 671. 
14 See also Gibson v Mayor, Aldermen and Burgesses of Preston (1879) LR 5 QB 218 (QB) 
15 M’Kinnon v Penson (1853) 8 Ex 319, 155 ER 1369 (Exch); aff’d (1854) 9 Ex 609, 156 ER 260 (Exch 
Ch). 
16 Bridges Act 1803, 43 Geo 3, c 59, s 4.  
17 M’Kinnon, above n 15, at 321.  
18 Young v Davis (1862) 7 H & N 760, 158 ER 675 (Exch), aff’d 2 H & C 197, 159 ER 82 (Exch Ch).  
19 At 770. 
20 Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] UKHL 15, [2004] 1 WLR 1057, at 
[50] [Gorringe UK]; Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923. 
21 Cowley v Newmarket Local Board [1892] AC 345 (HL). 
22 Municipality of Pictou v Geldert [1893] AC 524 (PC), at 527. 
23 Municipal Council of Sydney v Bourke [1895] AC 433 (PC). 
 
15 
 
B Further Development 
In McClelland v Manchester Corporation it was held that doing something to a road, 
but omitting “some precaution”24 amounted to misfeasance. The corporation had 
moreover actively created a danger in the road layout.25 This, a similar case,26 and the 
concept of “artificial works” not being part of the road itself, and thus not subject to 
the rule,27 represented a desire to draw back from the pure interpretation of the rule, 
which was characterised as applying only for “mere” non-feasance. On the other hand, 
letting a road decay or failing to do enough work to stop it was simply non-feasance.28 
Moreover, a body with additional functions as well as roads, such as a local board 
of health, could be found liable through a negligent act in using those other powers, 
such as water or sewerage,29 land drainage,30 or even traffic control31 and utility 
poles.32 A number of rather fine distinctions were thus introduced to limit the rule.33 
It applied only for “characteristic highway duties” such as repairing the road.34 On the 
other hand Lord Halsbury refused to address the “metaphysical” question of where 
one capacity ended and another started.35 The point was still being argued in 2002.36 
The rule also developed in Australia. In Buckle v Bayswater Road Board37 the 
broken drain that caused an injury was regarded as an “artificial work”.38 In Gorringe 
v The Transport Commission (Tasmania) (Gorringe AU)39, a truck fell into a hole 
caused by a faulty repair. Fullagar J considered that no-one was “subject to any duty 
enforceable by action to repair or keep in repair any highway” they managed, and that 
a duty to repair a road imposed by statute was not enforceable unless the statute made 
it clear it was to be enforceable by a person injured by the breach of that duty.40 In 
fact, the unenforceability of failure to repair had been extended by cases like Cowley, 
                                                          
24 McClelland v Manchester Corporation [1912] 1 KB 118 (KB) at 127. 
25 Gorringe v The Transport Commission (Tasmania) (1950) 80 CLR 357, at 364 [Gorringe AU]. 
26 Mayor and Corporation of Shoreditch v Bull (1904) 90 LT Rep 210 (HL). 
27 Borough of Bathurst v MacPherson (1878) 4 App Cas 256 (PC).  
28 Wilson v Kingston-upon-Thames Corporation [1948]2 All ER 780 (KB), aff’d [1949] 1 All ER 679 
(CA); Burton v West Suffolk County Council [1960] 2 QB 72 (CA). 
29 White v Hindley Local Board (1875) LR 10 QB 219 (QB) (defective road grating); Newsome v Darton 
Urban District Council [1938] 3 All ER 93 (CA) (poor repairs after drain excavation). 
30 Attorney-General v St Ives Rural District Council [1960] 1 QB 312 (QB), aff’d [1961] 1 QB 366 
(CA). 
31 Skilton v Epsom and Ewell Urban District Council [1937] 1 KB 112 (CA) (loose road stud); Turner 
v Ku-ring-gai Municipal Council (1990) 72 LGRA 60, 12 MVR 321 (NSWCA) (absent warning signs). 
32 Thompson v Bankstown Municipal Council (1955) 87 CLR 619. 
33 See also W Friedmann, “Liability of Highway Authorities” (1951) 5 Res Jud 21 at 23–25. 
34 Simon v Islington Borough Council [1943] 1 KB 188 (CA). 
35 Shoreditch, above n 26, at 211. 
36 Gulliksen v Pembrokeshire County Council [2002] EWCA Civ 968, [2003] QB 123. 
37 Buckle v Bayswater Road Board (1936) 57 CLR 259. 
38 See also Webb v South Australia (1982) 43 ALR 465, 56 ALJR 912 (HCA). 
39 Gorringe AU, above n 25. 
40 At 376. 
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Pictou, and Bourke41 to there being “no duty enforceable by action to be careful in 
control and management”.42 The court found for the roading authority, “reaffirm[ing] 
the non-feasance rule in all its rigidity”.43 
New Zealand had followed the non-feasance rule since the nineteenth century.44 
In 1963 it was alleged in the Court of Appeal that a washout on a road was caused by 
inadequate pipes fitted during previous repairs.45   The “artificial structure” argument 
was dismissed – the drains were part of the highway.46 The majority thought liability 
depended on misfeasance, fitting the wrong pipes. Gresson P, dissenting, thought it 
was non-feasance, not having enough pipe capacity. Both he and North J referred to 
the rule as “anomalous” and “archaic”.47 The case illustrates the niceties of the 
distinctions that had to be drawn to decide between misfeasance and non-feasance. 
C Cases Continued in England Even After the Rule Was Abrogated 
The Highways (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1961 (UK) “abrogated” the exemption 
for non-repair:48  
The rule of law exempting the inhabitants at large and any other persons as their 
successors from liability for non-repair of highways is hereby abrogated. 
Professor Dworkin’s view that the Act was the “death knell” of the non-feasance 
rule” proved unfounded,49 as later cases have held that the abrogation was not total.50 
Lord Denning MR in Burnside v Emerson drew a distinction between a failure to 
maintain (which included repair) that was long-lived, and a “transient danger due to 
elements”.51 Such short term danger – such as from ice or floods – was “not in itself 
evidence of a failure to maintain”.52  
The rule was abrogated only for non-repair.53 The non feasance rule still remained 
for other than non-repair. Non-repair did not include obstructions, unless they also 
caused damage to the road, nor ice.54 This was upheld by the House of Lords in 2000, 
limiting the abrogation to the fabric of the road, including its surface, but not material 
                                                          
41 Above nn 21, 22, and 23 respectively. 
42 Gorringe AU, above n 25, at 379. 
43 Friedmann, above n 33, at 26. 
44 Tarry v The Taranaki County Council (1894) 12 NZLR 467. 
45 Above n 5. 
46 At 540. 
47 At 519 and 532. 
48 Highways (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1961 (UK), s 1(1). It came into force 3 years after it was 
passed, that is, in August 1964: s 1(2). 
49 Gerald Dworkin “Highways (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1961 – The Death Knell of Nonfeasance 
Immunity for Highway Authorities” (1962) 25 MLR 336. 
50 Gorringe UK, above n 20, at [50]. 
51 Burnside v Emerson [1968] 1 WLR 1480 (CA), at 1494. 
52 At 1494. 
53 Haydon v Kent County Council [1978] 1 QB 343 (CA) at 359. 
54 Hereford and Worcester County Council v Newman [1975]1 WLR 901 (CA) at 911 re ice. 
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on the surface like ice.55 While in plain language “maintain” was wide enough to 
include gritting for ice, the 1959 Act was a consolidation, “not a code which sprang 
fully formed from the legislative head, but was built upon centuries of highway law”.56 
While the duty was originally a common law duty, it became statutory, and those 
statutes were held not to have introduced new repair liabilities, but only to have passed 
on common law obligations to other parties. The duty still remained with the 
inhabitants at large, working through the new bodies.57  
The House considered it was for Parliament to clarify the extent of the Highways 
Act abrogation, and Parliament did later add ice and snow to it,58 in reaction to 
Goodes.59 The abrogation still does not apply to loose gravel, oil spills, mud and 
slips.60  In Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council (Gorringe UK) the 
House of Lords rejected the plaintiff’s contention that the absence of a warning of a 
crest (on which she hit a bus) meant the road was out of repair. “The provision of 
information, whether by street furniture or painted signs, is quite different from 
keeping the highway in repair.”61 Thus omitting to maintain a sign was protected by 
the non-feasance rule. The distinctions drawn are fine: in Bird v Pearce,62 in a similar 
fact situation to Gorringe UK, the court found for the plaintiff.  
Fine distinctions were again made in a recent case, where wet concrete spilled on 
the road was judged to be part of its fabric as it had “hardened and bonded permanently 
to the surface of the road”.63 A cyclist who was thrown off his cycle by the concrete 
was thus able to recover. One commentator now believes that there is no obligation to 
actively carry out the duty to maintain.64 The rule hangs on with the help of the 
judiciary, as it is “so firmly rooted in the common law”.65 The limited nature of the 
exclusions “only serves to underline what is the general rule”.66  
D Brodie v Singleton Shire Council 
In this 2001 Australian case67 an unsafe bridge collapsed under an overweight truck. 
The truck’s driver and its owner sued the bridge owner Council in negligence. Earlier 
                                                          
55 Goodes v East Sussex County Council [2000] 1 WLR 1356 (HL). 
56 At 1360. 
57 St Ives, above n 30; Gorringe UK, above n 20. 
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59  Gorringe UK, above n 20, at [101]. 
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jurisprudence in Australia had followed the non-feasance exemption for liability. By 
the time of Brodie there were calls for reform.68  
The majority judgments69 trenchantly criticised the non-feasance rule. It had too 
many “unprincipled exceptions” and “capricious differences”, and was inconsistently 
applied.70 It had “produced countless distinctions, exceptions, qualifications and 
uncertainties”.71 The myriad exceptions caused the “immunity” in the rule to work 
poorly, and to “provoke rather than settle litigation, and lead to … struggles over 
elusive, abstract distinctions with no root in principle and which are foreign to the 
merits of the litigation”.72 Judges had used the distinctions and complexities as 
“disreputable escape mechanism” to avoid unjust decisions.73 
Moreover the distinctions were “illusory” as a bad repair might create a liability 
yet doing nothing at all would escape liability.74 On the other hand, omitting a step 
while actually taking action might be found to be misfeasance.75 In order to get relief, 
plaintiffs might seek a “positive action”, involving “a detailed investigation of the 
authority’s past records”, which might deter meritorious cases.76 It was unprincipled 
and unorthodox for the common law to give one type of statutory authority “a special 
immunity that Parliament has not expressly enacted”.77 
However valid the rule in the time of Russell,78 where there was no set body of 
people to sue, today highway authorities were independent legal personalities capable 
of being sued. The argument that the current legislation merely transferred the original 
obligations was of no relevance in Australia, where from the beginning highway 
authorities had been creatures of statute.79 But, “by a kind of time warp, the English 
rule came to be applied in Australia”,80 “simply picked up and applied without any, or 
any proper, regard to particular Australian statutory contexts”.81 
                                                          
68 Barbara McDonald “Before the High Court – Immunities under attack: The Tort Liability of Highway 
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70 At [68] and [79]–[83]. 
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72 At [67], [80] and [230]. 
73 At [199]. 
74 At [86] and [135]. 
75 At [89]. 
76 At [136].  
77 At [231].  
78 Above n 10. 
79 Brodie, above n 2, at [99]–[101] and [194]. 
80 At [196]. 
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Earlier applications of the rule, such as in Buckle,82 had also ignored Australian 
decisions applying the law of negligence to highway situations, as early as 1905.83 
Buckle had “chok[ed] the development of the common law in Australia” in this area.84 
While Buckle had been decided at a time when negligence and nuisance were 
intertwined, there had been a tendency in more current decisions to include the 
highway rule immunity as applying in pure negligence cases, introducing unnecessary 
complexities.85  It was now appropriate “to treat public nuisance, in its application to 
highway cases, as ‘absorbed by the principles of ordinary negligence’”.86 
The non-feasance rule was thus abolished.87 Highway authorities were under a 
duty to take reasonable care that what they do or fail to do in exercising their powers 
“does not create a foreseeable risk of harm”.88 The duty did not extend to all failures 
to repair, only those which create a foreseeable risk of harm, and those that do not 
involve “unreasonable measures” to fix.89 It would, however, extend to design and 
construction of the road (with the same limitations).90 
On the facts of Brodie, the danger of the weak bridge could reasonably have been 
foreseen by the authority. In fact, they had inspected the bridge but negligently failed 
to notice the problem with the girders.91 The council held a duty to take reasonable 
care in maintaining the bridge, and to give warning of its condition.92  
The reaction was great concern about the extension of liability by the removal of 
the non-feasance rule, and the “unrealistic” requirements for authorities’ management 
and maintenance of roads, and on their insurance.93  
As a result94 each state (except Northern Territory)95 passed an Act overturning 
this aspect of the decision.96 The New South Wales Civil Liability Act 2002, s 45, was 
held to be an absolute bar to liability in Porter v Lachlan Shire Council.97 If it had not 
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been for s 45, the primary judge would have found the Council liable, and the Court 
of Appeal agreed.98  
The case and its reasoning have been largely ignored by the British judiciary. 
There have been a large number of “highway rule” cases decided in England since 
Brodie, including in superior courts,99 and they make no mention of the case. The 
exception is Almeda v Attorney General for Gibraltar, in the Privy Council, which 
noted Brodie as of relevance to Australia only, and agreed with the minority that any 
change was best left to Parliament.100  
II Themes 
We can draw a number of themes from the cases on non-feasance. 
A Only Public Highway Authorities Qualify 
Highways were originally the responsibility of the citizens of the area, acting without 
incorporation. So keeping roads repaired was a collective responsibility.101 
Parishioners in theory supplied their own labour and materials, organised by a parish 
surveyor, but by the early 19th century the use of personal labour had fallen into 
desuetude, and the obligation was largely commuted to money.102 In this collective 
approach lay the seeds of the misfeasance/non-feasance distinction. In Russell there 
was no incorporated body to sue. But when there later was an incorporated body, 
judges transferred the immunity despite that,103 as the liability was still taken as being 
with the public at large. 
In early times, the public were truly the public, not represented by intermediary 
bodies. There was then and later no “special tenderness which the law feels for 
highway authorities” but simply because there was no action against the “inhabitants 
at large”.104 Only the Crown could interfere.105  
Fullagar J’s106 view that “no persons” had a duty to keep highways in repair was 
expressly approved of (despite Brodie, as noted above) in Almeda – the non-feasance 
rule also still applies in Gibraltar.107 Even today, modern statutes are interpreted in the 
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light of this historical position of public bodies merely taking over the administration 
of the obligation on the public at large.108 In New Zealand the rule was also copied,109 
despite the management of roads resting with incorporated councils from a very early 
time,110 and is valid even today.111 
The persistence of the rule is largely due to the argument that the statutes merely 
transferred the obligation. It has proved to be a mould that is hard to break out of, The 
High Court of Australia in Brodie tried, and failed not only practically in Australia but 
also intellectually in being unable to persuade the English judiciary to shift their 
position.  
Since the rule only applied to public bodies, it did not apply to railways in Britain. 
Since they were companies, private bodies, before 1948112, they could not benefit. 
While in Australia and New Zealand public bodies ran railways since their inception, 
the rule did not benefit them. They were, moreover, never “public” in the “public at 
large” sense in Russell.  
Clearly the private railway companies could be (and were) sued in negligence for 
damages in circumstances alleging inaction. Lord Halsbury noted in 1886 that 
establishing a negligent omission would be enough to succeed against a railway 
company.113  Failure to repair a tunnel made a private railway liable for subsequent 
injury in New Zealand.114 Omitting to narrow the slots for rail wheel flanges in a 
Canadian street (which caused a motorcycle rider to fall off) resulted in liability for 
the railway, even though it had statutory authority to run along the street.115 In 
Australia, failure to have proper systems to prevent children playing in a station also 
brought liability.116 Failure to assess risk could also be negligent.117 So too was failure 
to provide a fence against a trespassing child.118  
However, the early developments were in the context of judicial rulings which then 
drastically limited railways’ liability for worker injury, and so favoured the railways. 
The combination of rules on common employment (a worker could not sue if the fault 
lay with an employee of the same company), willing assumption of risk (volenti non 
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fit injuria), and contributory negligence worked in the 19th century to deprive workers 
of redress in the courts.119 On the other hand, judges readily found for the plaintiff 
when he or she was a passenger.120 
Railways which owned roadways open to the public were subject to the normal 
rules of negligence, although some early cases toyed with the idea that railways should 
have the same immunity as roads.121  In Swain v Southern Railway Company122 the 
facts invited an application of the non-feasance rule. A bridge over the railway, owned 
by the railway but open to the public, was inadequately maintained, injuring the 
plaintiff. It was argued that the railway was in the same position as a highway 
authority, as a body doing the work in the place of the parish surveyor. The rule applied 
to all bodies created by statute. Thus the railway should have the benefit of the non-
feasance immunity. The judge disagreed. As the road was not properly maintained, 
the railway was negligent. 
The railway appealed, unsuccessfully. “The Southern Railway Company cannot in 
any sense be said to represent or stand in the shoes of the inhabitants”.123 A 
commercial company could not claim benefits from rules applying to public 
corporations.124 “It would be startling”, the Court of Appeal said, “if a railway 
company, which by failing to repair a bridge caused a hole in a road, was not liable to 
any person suffering damage thereby”.125 Thus even on exactly the same facts, a 
railway would be liable and the highway not, because the historical reason for the 
highway rule lay in a duty on the inhabitants of a parish to repair, enforceable only by 
indictment. 
The open access nature of highways has also had a bearing on the development of 
the rule. In Buckle Dixon J referred to the common right of highway use, and the 
establishment of authorities “in order that the public right may be enjoyed to best 
advantage”.126 In Brodie, Hayne J (dissenting) noted that giving access to all meant 
that no special responsibility for hazards could be imposed on users, unlike the 
situation on private land.127 For this reason, road authorities were not occupiers in the 
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legal sense,128 with the public right of way reducing the control they have on who 
might enter their land.129 On the other hand, a railway is an occupier, with a duty of 
care.130 This in itself a differential in treatment relative to roads. 
The highway non-feasance cases include those dealing with trips and falls on 
footpaths, where the relevant authority has neglected to repair out of level flagstones, 
manhole covers, and the like.131 When such a slip or fall occurs on railway premises, 
the liability picture is different. In a number of cases involving slips on station 
platforms or access roads, with a danger caused by inaction, the railway as an occupier 
had a duty of care, although it had not always failed to discharge that duty.132  
Over time the rule was limited so non-road public bodies were not normally given 
its benefit. It only applied to highways.133 Jetty and pier authorities were not given the 
same immunity, even though a pier is largely the same structure as a bridge.134  
B Public Law Alternatives 
The rule only applied to persons privately seeking compensation, usually for personal 
injury. A public body could still be brought to account by indictment135 involving 
penal sanctions,136and in more modern terms judicial review through writs calling on 
it to perform its function.137 
Historically, it was an offence against the King to fail to maintain his highway.  
Since the King’s subjects could not pass freely138 if the road was out of repair, the 
justices had a duty to enforce repair. The indictment forced the parish, and later local 
councils, to do their duty and repair the roads (but not to improve them).139 The remedy 
for non-repair was a fine, which became used for maintaining the roads; or at least 
forgiven if the roads were later put into repair. The Webbs called the indictment a 
“device”, by which parishes were held to account for the state of their roads, and in 
effect for levying rates.140  
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From the 17th to the 19th centuries this process was well used, with many reported 
cases.141 A number of cases in the 20th century referred to indictment as the proper 
method for getting public bodies to act on poor repair, but actual cases were much less 
numerous than in earlier years. The indictment route remained law in England until 
the duty to maintain on the inhabitants at large was abolished in 1959.142   
The current law in England and Wales is the Highways Act 1980 (UK). Section 
56 is the statutory embodiment of the old indictment.143 This route for holding roading 
authorities to account for repair is now a civil action to compel authorities to do their 
duty.144 There have however been few reported cases.145 The remedy is an order to put 
the road in repair, which limits its usefulness. A person suffering loss from non-repair 
wants compensation, not merely rectification of the problem. 
C The Interplay of Nuisance and Negligence 
How the liabilities in negligence and nuisance interact is an important theme. The 
boundaries between negligence and nuisance can be fine; and actions can be taken in 
both on the same facts. Nuisance in the highway context is public nuisance, and in the 
highway situation there became little difference in outcome between suing in one or 
the other.146 The distinctions became so fine that the two torts have been have 
effectively merged in this area,147 and compensation is better sought through 
negligence.148 
Diplock LJ points out that the non-feasance rule originated in nuisance, and was a 
concession (to highway authorities) from the otherwise absolute duty to maintain.149 
But the highway liability was not purely developed in nuisance. There were a number 
of early 19th century cases essentially in negligence.150  And while in England and 
New Zealand the rule developed in nuisance, in Australia an early High Court case151 
started a local strand in negligence, ultimately a strand that was overwhelmed by the 
English approach.152  
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The action in nuisance for failure to repair a road originates much further back 
than Russell.  Nuisance in this situation derived from interference with a right of access 
to private land,153 but the “superficial resemblance between the blocking of a private 
way and blocking of a public highway” led to the latter being called a nuisance, “and 
thus was born the public nuisance”.154 
In fact early 19th century cases in England were in negligence,155 and nuisance 
was not named as a cause of action until about 1840.156 The “intrusion of nuisance … 
lacked any firm doctrinal basis”.157 In a number of mid to late 20th century cases, the 
interplay of the two torts was examined. In the particular case of damage on highways, 
“fault of some kind, which may be negligence, is essential”.158 However, the use of 
nuisance as a cause of action may have been chosen more widely because it did not 
need proof of a duty of care nor its breach, and the burden of proof to justify a nuisance 
was on the defendant.159  
After Brodie, in Australia now there is a hybrid of an action in negligence, with 
only “a duty to take reasonable care to maintain”,160 subject to the statutory imposition 
of a defence arising from a situation of absolute liability in nuisance. In effect, 
highway authorities are better off after Brodie, because plaintiffs have to prove all the 
elements of negligence in terms of making a case for culpable action, and yet cannot 
claim for non-repair. 
Even in Gorringe UK, where the case was brought in both nuisance and 
negligence, Lord Hoffman rejected the negligence claim, as inconsistent with the 
traditional limitations on liability, which arise from nuisance.161 By Yetkin v Mahmood 
however, despite extensive discussion of Gorringe UK, the analysis and decision were 
only about negligence.162  
One might now argue that neither tort is now particularly relevant in safety issues 
in New Zealand, for either injury compensation or attribution of fault. The accident 
compensation regime removes any relevance for personal injury,163  and in terms of 
other damage, and deterrence, it may be simpler and more effective to prosecute for a 
health and safety breach. For such breaches the duty is in the statute, and no duty of 
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care has to be found; and the statutory defences create high hurdles, high enough to 
make liability close to absolute.164  Private prosecutions are possible, and restoration 
or reparations can be ordered.165 The problem is though that the health and safety 
legislation might not apply to road owners. This is further discussed in Chapter Four. 
D Relationship Between Negligence and Statutory Duties 
A further theme arises from inability of some parties in recent years to establish 
their case under the common law or statute.166 They have consequently tried to derive 
a duty of care from a failure to use a power. This has its origins in Stovin v Wise167 
(failure to remove a bank), which was followed by Larner v Solihull Metropolitan 
Borough Council168 (failure to mark a road). 
Gorringe UK also concerned road markings. The statutory duty to maintain did 
not apply as the issue was not about the surface of the road structure itself.  On the 
basis of Larner, it was argued that the statutory power and public law duty to promote 
road safety (under the Road Traffic Act 1988 s 39(2)) gave rise to a parallel common 
law duty of care to take appropriate road safety measures, including a warning of a 
crest. The House of Lords rejected that submission. Lord Hoffman found it “difficult 
to imagine a case in which a common law duty can be founded simply upon the failure 
(however irrational) to provide some benefit which a public authority has a power (or 
a public law duty) to provide”.169 Lord Steyn noted that the relationship between 
negligence and statutory duties and powers is a subject of great complexity and very 
much an evolving area of law.170  
Despite the beating it was given in Gorringe UK, a duty derived from a power may 
still develop into a means of holding road owners to account. For example, in Rice v 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, a case involving asbestos injury, the Court 
of Appeal decided a duty of care was possible – there was a specific employment duty 
to an individual rather than a “broad target power or duty directed at the public at 
large”.171 This outcome is somewhat at odds with the Gorringe UK, and reinforces 
Lord Steyn’s view that the matter is complex and as yet not settled. 
Cases like Hamlin172 have extended the scope of duties of care to bodies on which 
people rely on, through the bodies’ superior knowledge of the subject. It might be 
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expected that people could rely on roading authorities, which thus might have similar 
obligations. However, given the strong statements from Lord Hoffman in Stovin and 
Gorringe about road users not being able to rely on roading authorities, but having to 
look out for themselves,173 and take the road “as they find it”,174 it is doubtful that a 
general reliance argument would hold much sway in the highway environment outside 
of creating a “trap”.175 Even what constitutes a “trap” is open to interpretation.176 Even 
though the law may still be developing in this area, it is likely that Gorringe has 
blocked another potential route for holding road authorities to account. It has “made it 
all but impossible to establish liability where the authority has not performed a positive 
act”.177  
E Cost 
A major theme running through the cases is the burden excessive claims would put 
on public bodies.178 Judges sought to protect public authorities’ limited funds so they 
could continue to contribute to development.179 Even as far back as Russell Ashhurst 
J said “it is better that an individual should sustain an injury than that the public should 
suffer an inconvenience”.180 To direct authorities to pay for inadvertence would add 
an unreasonable burden.181 This theme continues to the present.182 That is not a 
consideration that was taken into account for private firms. Nor is it language that fits 
well with the modern “reasonably practicable”183 view of safety.  
An early New Zealand case noted that Councils should “do the best with the means 
at their disposal to ensure safety”.184 The magistrate at first instance in another case185 
referred to insufficient funds as excusing failure to maintain. An English council that 
had a discretion to light a road turned off the lights at night to save money, but was 
not liable for the plaintiff’s fall and injury.186 
Statutory bodies’ financial position even justified a lower standard, so that what 
might for others be “unjustifiably risky” could “be condoned as well-meant error of 
                                                          
173 Stovin, above n 20, at 958; Gorringe UK, above n 20, at [12]. 
174 Stovin, above n 20, at 958. 
175 Gorringe UK, above n 20, at [43].  
176 Piles of gravel caused by one defendant’s poor sweeping may have created a trap, even though the 
case against the other defendant was rejected because the gravel was simply on the surface: Valentine, 
above n 60. 
177 Booth and Squires, above n 111, at [15.33]. 
178 McDonald, above n 68, at 424. 
179 Brodie, above n 2, at [100]. 
180 Russell, above n 10, at 673. 
181 Cowley, above n 21, at 349. 
182 Mills v Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council [1992] PIQR 291 (CA) at 295; Simson v London 
Borough of Islington [2013] EWHC 2527 (QB). 
183  HSWA, s 22. 
184 Inhabitants of the Featherston Road District v Tate (1898) 17 NZLR 349 (CA), at 355. 
185 Tarry, above n 44, at 468. 
186 Sheppard v Glossop Corporation [1921] 3 KB 132 (CA). 
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judgment”.187 Public bodies should face a “less exacting standard” than ordinarily 
imposed.188 They should not become “a sort of insurer of every person who travelled 
on the road”.189 
The modern expression of this point is Lord Hoffman’s speeches in Stovin190 and 
Gorringe UK.191 He thought judges examining a body’s budgetary decisions could 
distort its priorities. Rather than spending on social services, they might “play safe” 
by spending more on roads to avoid “enormous liabilities”.192 That is exactly what 
railways are expected to do, save that the liabilities are now HSWA sanctions. Road 
safety budgets might be used up in defending litigation.193 Being rated for roads was 
burden enough without that.194 So too in a more recent case: inspections to identify 
and avert danger “would have substantial economic implications for local 
authorities”.195 Academics have criticised the indiscriminate cost argument as “paltry 
justification”196 and anomalous compared with other analogous fault liabilities.197 
The costs do not just disappear if the highway authority does not bear them; they 
are reallocated, usually to individual users. As Kirby J put it:198  
… a burden of loss distribution is imposed on the victims of the neglect of such 
authorities. The immunity obliges those victims to bear the economic, as well as 
personal, consequences, even of gross and outrageous neglect and incompetence. 
The personal consequences can be severe, as Mrs Gorringe found out when unable 
to claim for her serious injuries.199 Even in New Zealand where personal injury is 
covered by accident compensation, there can still be property damage falling on the 
defendant.  
The issue of justiciability has also been raised, about the courts’ capability to judge 
allocations between scarce resources. Booth and Squires note that it is for the 
legislature to make choices between, for example, workplace safety, education, and 
improving highway safety.200 The legislature when it makes such choices, can make 
them inconsistently. This dissertation argues that that has occurred in the balance 
between road and rail safety. And when the courts do act, they do so conservatively 
                                                          
187 East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v Kent [1941] AC 74 (HL), at 95–96. 
188 At 95. 
189 Young, above n 18. 
190 Stovin, above n 20. 
191 Gorringe UK, above n 20. 
192 Stovin, above n 20. 
193 Gorringe UK, above n 20, at [33]. 
194 At [12].  
195 Ali v Bradford Metropolitan District Council [2010] EWCA Civ 1282, [2012] 1 WLR 161, at [39]. 
196 JG Fleming The Law of Torts (9th ed, Law Book Company, Sydney, 1998) at 485, quoted in 
McDonald, above n 68, at 426. 
197 McDonald, above n 68, at 425 and 426. 
198 Brodie, above n 2, at [235]. 
199 Gorringe UK, above nn 20 and 61. 
200 Booth and Squires, above n 111, at [2.91]. 
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and reinforce the imbalance. Thus they offer very little constraint on roading 
authorities in terms of safety. 
III Conclusion 
The long-standing non-feasance rule is still alive, and still gives highway authorities 
a concession, albeit (ostensibly) with reduced importance. However, the English 
courts have limited the statutory exemptions, and in Australia the legislatures have 
firmly re-imposed the rule after a well-reasoned attempt to overrule it in Brodie. In 
New Zealand the rule still applies, though practically it is of limited effect. The themes 
and arguments over the rule’s long history are likely to have affected authorities’ 
attitude to safety, for example arguments about cost. 
Thus road authorities have long derived advantages from the common law. Few 
such advantages were given to railways, which have been subject to the full force of 
the law on negligence, even for omission. 
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Chapter Three: New Zealand road and rail safety legislation 
I Introduction 
This chapter examines the treatment of road and rail safety in New Zealand statute 
law. It shows the intensive supervision of rail, and the dearth of legislation on safety 
liability for roading authorities. It also makes international comparisons. How the 
Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 extends to impose road and rail safety obligations 
is discussed in Chapter Four. 
II Roads 
A Municipal Corporations and Counties Acts 
Roading was historically a local government function in New Zealand. Early national 
legislation gave the local councils general powers to construct roads,1 and gave county 
councils the “care and management of all county roads”, but powers were not specified 
in detail.2 Each successive Act specified the powers more closely. But these were 
powers and rights, as distinct from duties and obligations. In the Municipal 
Corporations Act 1876 (MCA) a new section was included, which gave municipalities 
some responsibilities to others for keeping the roads safe:3 
The Council shall take all sufficient precautions to prevent accidents during the 
construction or repair of any street ….  
Note, however, that this obligation was confined to the circumstance of road 
works. There remained no general obligation to keep roads safe. From 1876 to 1954 
on the words of s 212 were repeated in each new MCA. Not until the final Counties 
Act (CA) in 1956 were the same responsibilities extended to counties.4 Counties were 
nevertheless liable in negligence and nuisance for not maintaining their roads properly, 
subject to the non-feasance rule.5 
                                                          
1 Municipal Corporations Ordinance 1842 5 Vict 6, cl 5. Municipalities (urban authorities) were subject 
to Municipal Corporations Acts [MCA] from then on, and rural “counties” to the Counties Acts (CA) 
from 1856. 
2 CA 1876, s 185. 
3 MCA 1876, s 212. 
4 CA 1956, s 194. 
5 For example, Tarry v Taranaki County Council (1894) 12 NZLR 467 (CA); Hokianga County v 
Parlane Brothers [1940] NZLR 315 (SC). 
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B Local Government Act 1974  
In 1978 the MCA 1954 and CA 1956 were repealed and the obligations section was 
incorporated into the Local Government Act 1974 (LGA) as s 353.6 But some 
introductory words were added, which arguably significantly widened its scope. The 
section now read, and still reads: 
353 General safety provisions as to roads 
The council shall take all sufficient precautions for the general safety of the 
public and traffic and workmen on or near any road, and in particular shall – 
(a)Take all reasonable precautions to prevent accidents during the construction 
or repair … of any road …. 
The rest of the section deals with obligations on adjacent landowners. 
Paragraph (a) retains the specific words relating to road works (albeit amended) 
but the new introductory words apply to “any road”. The clause was represented in the 
explanatory note to the Bill as a mere re-enactment of previous law, with “no major 
changes”,7 but in reality it added a much more concrete obligation. The words 
“sufficient precautions” were left unaltered by the select committee, whereas the same 
words in paragraph (a) were altered to “reasonable precautions”.8 This suggests a 
separate meaning, and effectively a stronger meaning for “sufficient precautions”, if 
intention is to be read into the words. The alternative is to suggest it was poor drafting 
to change one instance and not the other. 
The use of somewhat unspecific words like “the general safety” might make the 
introductory words just a “target” obligation,9 one that can be striven for but need not 
be fully achieved if the policies and budgets of the authority have other priorities. On 
the other hand, the words aim to protect the “public”, not just a subsection like 
workers, akin to the obligations on rail operators.  
As well, some cases have considered this section in terms of a power, not a duty.10 
“The purpose of s 353 is to empower the council to erect safety precautions”, and “to 
enable the council to warn users of the highway of a danger”.11 Paragraphs (b) and (c) 
are indeed expressed as powers (or at least a duty to exercise a power).  
The introductory words and paragraph (a) are however clearly expressed as duties. 
There is no specific penalty on a council for breaching these duties. However, they are 
                                                          
6 Local Government Amendment Act 1978, s 2 inserting new s 353. 
7 Local Government Amendment (No 4) Bill 1977 (171-1), (explanatory note, re Part XXI). 
8 Local Government Amendment (No4) Bill 1977, (171-2), cl 2 inserting new section 353. 
9 Larner v Solihull Metropolitan Borough Council [2001] RTR 32 (CA) at [8], Gorringe v Calderdale 
Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] UKHL 15, [2004] 1 WLR 1057 at [29] and [90]. 
10 Police v Abbott [2009] NZAR 705 (CA) at [20] and [22]. 
11 Abbott v Police [2008] NZAR 285 (HC) at [18] and [20]. 
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not merely target obligations, as shown by the (albeit scant) case law. In Parkin v 
Tararua District Council12 paragraph (a) of the section was used to found a private 
action for criminal nuisance. Mr Parkin’s motor cycle slid on loose gravel at road 
works, extensively damaging it, and he successfully argued that the council should 
have cleaned the gravel up.   
These cases focus on the “in particular” paragraphs of the section, and do not 
identify the introductory words as a discrete obligation. Indeed, Parkin the judge 
conflated the two in “translat[ing] this convoluted section” as giving an obligation 
only in the context of road works.13 The facts of that case were just about road works, 
so this reading can be distinguished as applying only to those facts.  
The case does cast some doubt on the reading of the introductory words as 
applying outside the circumstances covered in the paragraphs. Nevertheless the plain 
meaning of the introductory words is that they cover all roads, not just those under 
repair or in need of protection from external danger, and form a separate obligation to 
those in the following paragraphs of the section. 
C State Highways 
The LGA applies only to local roads, which account for 88 per cent of New Zealand’s 
95,000km of public roads,14 but only 52 per cent of the traffic.15 The more densely 
trafficked state highways (11,000km), are administered by the New Zealand Transport 
Agency (NZTA) and are governed in respect to safety by the Government Roading 
Powers Act 1989 (GRPA) and the Land Transport Management Act 2003 (LTMA).  
From 1953 the National Roads Board, which managed main highways, was subject 
to “powers, rights, duties and obligations vested in or imposed on any local 
authority”.16 From the amendment to the LGA in 1978 until it was replaced by Transit 
New Zealand, the National Roads Board had the obligations in LGA s 353.  
Ostensibly the powers and obligations of LGA s 353 were carried over into the 
Transit New Zealand Act 1989 (successor to the National Roads Act, and now the 
GRPA) by s 61(2) of that Act. However the vesting of the powers and duties is worded 
differently to that in the National Roads Act. The heading of s 61 is “Powers and duties 
of Agency in relation to State highways” (the Agency is now NZTA). But subsection 
(2) is worded so that only the rights and powers of s 353 are applicable to state 
highways, and not the duties and obligations:17 
                                                          
12 Parkin v Tararua District Council [2004] DCR 882. 
13 At [17]. 
14 New Zealand Transport Agency [NZTA] <www.nzta.govt.nz>.  
15 Ministry of Transport <www.transport.govt.nz>. 
16 National Roads Act 1953, s 13. 
17 Government Roading Powers Act 1989, s 61(2) [GRPA]. 
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All rights and powers vested in any local authority under sections 
331, 332, 334, 335, 337 to 341, and 353 of the Local Government Act 1974, and 
all rights and powers vested in any local authority in relation to roads under any 
other Act, may in respect of any State highway be exercised by the Agency. 
This may be a simple drafting error, or it may be deliberate, but as it stands its 
meaning has to be derived “from its text and in the light of its purpose”18. Its text is 
unambiguously not about obligations. The use of “exercised” supports this 
interpretation, since a duty is not typically “exercised”. Even though the headings can 
now be prayed in aid of interpretation of the body of the text,19 it is difficult to see 
how the “obligations” in the heading can help read that word into the clear rights and 
powers schema of the subsection. Moreover there are other subsections of s 61 that 
could be interpreted as duties,20 so the use of “duties” in the heading is meaningful 
without applying it to subsection (2). Thus the true reading of the section is that 
Parliament’s intention was to exempt state highways from the safety duties borne by 
local roads. 
The Transit New Zealand Act 1989 did not have an explicit purpose section. The 
authority (Transit New Zealand) was given a “principal objective” of promoting 
policies and allocating resources “to achieve a safe and efficient land transport system 
that maximises national economic and social benefits”.21 To some extent this can be 
viewed as indicating the purpose of the Act, but the multiple and potentially 
conflicting parts of the objective make its role as a safety objective no better than a 
target one. 
The LTMA altered Transit’s objective to “operat[ing] the State highway system in 
a way which contributes to an integrated, safe, responsive, and sustainable land 
transport system”,22 a change which did not alter the target nature of the objective. 
Moreover, it only had to contribute to a safe system, not actually achieve one. 
The title of the Transit New Zealand Act was changed to the GRPA in 2008,23 but 
still does not have an explicit purpose. What provisions remain are reflective of its 
new title; “powers” to make the process of making roads easier. Hence if a purpose 
was to be derived from the Act, it would not support the inclusion of safety obligations 
to other parties. 
The objective of NZTA (Transit’s successor) is similar to Transit’s, to contribute 
to an effective, efficient, and safe land transport system.24 Its functions are similarly 
                                                          
18 Interpretation Act 1999, s 5(1). 
19 Section 5(2) and (3). 
20 GRPA, s 61 (5A) and (7). 
21 Transit New Zealand Act 1989, s 5.  
22 Land Transport Management Act 2003, s 77(1) (as originally enacted). 
23 Land Transport Management Amendment Act 2008, s 50(1). 
24 Land Transport Management Act, s 94. 
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unspecific in relation to safety, and it too has to have social and environmental 
sensibility.25 In fact, the whole purpose of the LTMA is expressed in the same general 
terms.26 
The Land Transport Act 1998 is the principal road safety legislation in New 
Zealand. This Act does introduce general responsibilities for participants in the land 
transport system (largely excluding rail), defined as those who do anything for which 
a “land transport document” is required.27 They must ensure they carry out their 
activities safely and in accordance with safety standards.28  The NZTA is the body that 
issues, revokes, and otherwise deals with land transport documents.29 Similarly, the 
Minister can make rules about safety30, and must consider risk and safety in making 
any rule.31 Rules can set out design standards,32 but there appear to be few rules about 
the safety of the actual roads applying to the owners of those roads. Indeed, The NZTA 
itself drafts and administers many of the rules.33 
D International Comparisons 
The rules about highway authority liability overseas are not consistent, although there 
are some useful models that might be used to improve the position in New Zealand. 
They range from no liability through to having to take reasonable care. 
In Australia, a number of states place no express safety responsibility on road 
owners.34 Indeed in Queensland there is a forthright statement that high levels of safety 
are not compatible with roading efficiency.35 In New South Wales the Act refers, in 
judging whether a public body has breached a duty of care, to the limits to the 
resources such a body has, and the “general allocation of these resources is not open 
to challenge”.36 The authority can rely on complying with its general procedures and 
standards.37 Furthermore an act or omission by the authority must be so unreasonable 
that no similar authority would consider it reasonable.38  
                                                          
25 Sections 95 and 96. 
26 Section 3. 
27 Land Transport Act 1998, s 2, definition of “participant”. 
28 Section 4. 
29 Land Transport Management Act 2003, s 95(3). 
30 Land Transport Act 1998, s 152. 
31 Section 164(1)(a) and (c). 
32 Section 157 (b). 
33 Two of those rules do impose specific obligations on roading authorities: Land Transport Rule: 
Setting of Speed Limits 2003; Land Transport Rule: Traffic Control Devices 2004. There are no 
sanctions in them for non-compliance, other than audit and being subject to Agency directions. 
34 Roads Act 1993 (NSW); Highways Act 1926 (SA); Main Roads Act 1930 (WA).  
35 Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld), s 4. 
36 Section 42(b). 
37 Section 42(d).  
38 Section 43. This is in fact the Wednesbury test: Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury 
Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 (CA). 
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In Victoria, on the other hand, and in England and Wales, there is a statutory duty 
to maintain the roads.39 People can sue for damages. In England and Wales, an 
authority can defend an action for failure to maintain by showing it took such care as 
was reasonable in the circumstances.40 The criteria for assessing reasonableness are 
specified,41 including the “character of the highway” and its traffic, the appropriate 
standard of maintenance for such a highway, the “state of repair which a reasonable 
person would have expected to find such a highway”, whether the authority knew (or 
“could reasonably have been expected to know”) that the highway’s condition was 
dangerous, and whether warning notices had been posted.42 Actions against an 
authority in Victoria are judged against the same criteria.43 
These provisions are a great advance on New Zealand’s absence of a statutory 
safety obligation for main highways. However Victoria’s safety obligations are 
heavily qualified, and there is ample room for an authority to escape liability even if 
its roads were deficient. The principles in the Wrongs Act 1958, s 83, are included by 
reference,44 including consideration of the resources available.45 Even though this is a 
wide exemption, it is further broadened by there being no liability for a breach of 
statutory duty unless the authority acted unreasonably, in Wednesbury terms.46 
The onus is on the authority to prove it had “taken such care as in all the 
circumstances was reasonably required to ensure that the relevant part of the public 
road was not dangerous for traffic”.47 A policy which addressed the relevant matter 
would be a sufficient defence.48 A policy could be written to cover any reasonable 
level of repair the authority wanted to limit itself to.49  
In England, even though the statute says that the reasonable care provisions are a 
defence, and early cases maintained that the liability was otherwise absolute,50 more 
recent cases have put hurdles in the way of plaintiffs, making them prove a danger 
before the reasonable care defence comes into play, despite danger in the statute being 
only an element in the defence.51  
                                                          
39 Road Management Act 2004 (Vic), s 40 [RMA (Vic)]; Highways Act 1980 (UK), s 41. 
40 Highways Act 1980 (UK), s 58(1). 
41 Section 58(2). 
42 Section 1(3). 
43 RMA (Vic), s 101. 
44 Section 101(1). 
45 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 83(a). 
46 Section 84. See Katrine Ludlow “Spit and Polish: ‘No Action’ is no longer an option for Victorian 
Road Authorities following the Road Management Act 2004” (Faculty of Law, Monash University, 
Melbourne Research paper 2007/34, 2009), at 52; Wednesbury, above n 39. 
47 RMA (Vic) s 105(1). 
48 Sections 103 and 105(3). 
49 Ludlow, above n 46, at 52. 
50 Griffiths v Liverpool Corporation [1967] 1 QB 374 (CA), at 389. 
51 Mills v Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council [1992] PIQR 291 (CA). 
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A recent development is the devolution of highways to corporate bodies. In New 
Zealand, the Transmission Gully Motorway is to be built and managed by a public-
private partnership.52 In England, all 7,000km53 of trunk roads are now administered 
by a state-owned company, Highways England.54 In both cases substantial safety 
obligations, with monetary penalties, have been placed on the new body.55 If such 
conditions can be placed on roads under corporate control, it raises the question of 
why they cannot also be placed on public roading authorities. 
Highways England is monitored by the Office of Road and Rail (ORR). The ORR 
also administers United Kingdom railway safety, and some of its rail experience might 
transfer to roads. However early experience suggests that is not so – a lower level of 
safety supervision is applied to roads than to rail.56 
In Ontario there are maintenance obligations for both provincial and local 
highways. Principal provincial highways “shall be maintained and kept in repair” by 
the Ministry of Transportation.57 The Crown is liable for “all damage” for default.58 A 
municipality “shall keep [its highways and bridges] in a state of repair that is 
reasonable in the circumstances, including the character and location of the highway 
or bridge”.59 It too is liable for “all damages” sustained as a result of default.60 It is a 
defence if the municipality did not know (or could not reasonably be expected to 
know) about the road’s state of repair, or it took reasonable steps to prevent the 
default.61 No action can be brought for action or inaction that “results from a policy 
decision” of the municipality.62 
Similar legislative provisions to those in Ontario are found in a number of other 
Canadian provinces.63 However, in British Columbia, the legislation gives powers to 
                                                          
52  NZTA <www.nzta.govt.nz>. 
53 4300 miles: Highways England <www.gov.uk/government/organisations/highways-england>. 
54 Infrastructure Act 2015 (UK), s 1; Highways England, above n 53. 
55 NZTA Transmission Gully motorway public-private partnership agreement, <www.nzta.govt.nz>; 
Department for Transport “Highways England: Licence – Secretary of State for Transport statutory 
directions and guidance to the strategic highways company” (April 2015), at [4.2], [5.15] and [8.2]. 
56 Office of Road and Rail “Highways Monitor Six month review of Highways England’s performance, 
April – September 2015”; “ORR’s Enforcement Policy for Highways England” (December 2015); 
<www.orr.gov.uk>; contrast the level of rail supervision on that website. 
57 Public Transportation and Highway Improvement Act RSO 1990 c P50, s 33(1). 
58 Section 33(2). 
59 Municipal Act SO 2001 c 25, s 44(1). 
60 Section 44(2). 
61 Section 44(3). 
62 Section 450. This reflects the common law in Canada: Just v British Columbia [1989] 2 SCR 1228.  
The distinction between policy and operational decisions is not made in New Zealand law: Michael 
Underdown “Surveys and Negligence” (2004) 18 MLAANZ Journal 24 at 28. 
63 For example, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta: Highways and Transportation Act RSM 1987 c 
H40, s 8; Municipal Act SM 1996 c 58, ss 293. 294, 386; Highways and Transportation Act SS 1997 c 
H-3.01, s 9 (note exclusion for damage by rocks, s 9(5)(c)); Municipalities Act SS 2005 c M36.1, s 343 
(also exempt for damage by rocks s 345(b)); Highways Development and Protection Act SA 2004 c H-
8.5, s 42. 
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roading authorities, rather than duties, in a similar way to New Zealand legislation.64 
The courts, including the Canadian Supreme Court, have still found the authorities 
liable for failure to maintain, citing a common law duty to take reasonable care when 
exercising a discretionary power.65 
III Rail 
A As a Government Department 
Since they began in New Zealand in 1863, railways have been governed by legislation. 
From the beginning, like road, legislation gave powers in the safety area to prevent 
damage and to prosecute those who endangered the railway.66 But, unlike roads, there 
were specific safety obligations to protect the public who used rail.67 This mirrored 
the situation in Britain, where a regulator, the Board of Trade, was appointed as early 
as 1840,68 and legislation imposed safety control, initially of a basic kind, covering 
level crossings, fences, accident reporting,69 accident investigation, and inspections,70 
but later extending to the use of block signalling, interlocking, and continuous brakes, 
all features of the modern railway.71 Safety regulation developed stepwise as major 
accidents occurred.72 
Government Railways Acts (GRA) were enacted in 1887, 1894, 1900, 1908, 1926, 
and 1949, and they were frequently amended as well. The railway could be sued at 
common law (without the misfeasance/non-feasance rule)73, but there were no specific 
statutory duties to the public about safety. The Railways Department was self-
regulating. This was taken seriously, and since no level of safety was specified, a high 
level was assumed, and it also reflected the lessons of accidents. This was reinforced 
by Ministerial Inquiries into serious accidents set up under the GRA 1949.74 
                                                          
64 Transportation Act SBC 2004 c 44, ss 2 and 47; Local Government Act RSBC 1996 c 23, ss176 and 
796. 
65 Lewis (Guardian ad litem of) v British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 1145, at [18]. Contrast Stovin v Wise 
[1996] AC 923 (HL) at 955. 
66 Railway Offences Act 1865. 
67 These involved government inspection of lines, accident reporting, and government powers to make 
changes: Railways Regulation and Inspection Act 1873, Railway Companies Act 1875, Railways 
Construction and Land Act 1881. 
68 Railway Regulation Act 1840 (UK) 3 & 4 Vict c 97, s 5. 
69 Railways Regulation Act 1842 (UK) 5 & 6 Vict c 55, ss 8, 9 and 10. 
70 Railways Regulation Act 1871 (UK) 35 & 35 Vict, c 78, ss 3 and 6. 
71 Regulation of Railways Act 1889 (UK) 52 & 53 Vict c 57, s 1.  
72 LTC Rolt Red for Danger (Pan, London, 1960). 
73 See Chapter Two. 
74 Government Railways Act 1949, s 68.  
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B New Zealand Railways Corporation 
In a major reform, the New Zealand Railways Corporation was set up in 1982.75 A 
scheme for (internal) setting and maintaining standards for railway operations was 
specified.76 The person at the head of the major engineering sections of the 
Corporation had to report annually on the safety of those sections.77 These marked a 
move away from general, target obligations to more direct accountability for safety, 
but were still not particularly specific. And while safety was “of prime importance”,78 
it was not expressed as the “primary” goal, and there were others that had to be met, 
such as financial goals.79 
C As Private Company 
When the railway was incorporated as a limited liability company (still a state-owned 
enterprise) in 1990, it was with a view to privatisation. It was felt that leaving public 
safety to an independent, and potentially private, company was inappropriate. Thus a 
new safety regime was introduced.80  
This regime much more thorough going than the one applying to railways 
previously, and than that for roads. It provided for independent supervision of safety, 
through the Ministry of Transport, and later the Land Transport Safety Authority. This 
was through a licensing regime, and before a licence was granted the railway had to 
have an approved safety system.81 
This safety system had to cover standards and procedures to ensure safety and 
compliance, management structures, systems for reporting accidents and incidents, 
driver training and standards, and audit.82 There was a specific obligation to report 
accidents and incidents.83 The principal sanction was suspension84 and even 
revocation85 of the licence, so a rail operator had to be demonstrably safe to remain in 
business.  
Clearly some of these measures have their counterpart in laws relating to vehicle 
condition, traffic regulation and driver qualification for road traffic. But the rail 
legislation did not confine itself to vehicles, as while the Act referred to the operation 
                                                          
75 New Zealand Railways Corporation Act 1981 
76 Section 46(2). 
77 Section 46(3)–46(5). 
78 Section 46(1). 
79 State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, s 4 – being “a successful business”, including profitability, was 
the “principal objective” of a state-owned enterprise, which the Corporation became when that Act was 
passed. 
80 Transport Services Licensing Amendment Act (No 3) 1992. 
81 Transport Services Licensing Act 1989, s 6A(2). 
82 Section 6B(2). 
83 Section 39A. 
84 Section 39D. 
85 Section 39B(c)(ii). 
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of a vehicle, the infrastructure it operated on needed to be safe for that vehicle 
operation to be safe, and so track, signalling and the like were also covered by the 
licence – even though simple provision of railway lines by itself was exempt.86  
Coverage of infrastructure distinguishes the treatment of rail from the treatment of 
road, since although road infrastructure also needs to be safe for the vehicles to be 
safe, the law does not extend to making this safety an obligation on the road owner, 
save as noted above. 
The current law on railway safety is the Railways Act 2005 (RA). It provides for 
more intensive safety management and duties than the Transport Services Licensing 
Act. Infrastructure owners are specifically covered, including simple railway line 
owners.87  
This Act provides for laws more aligned to the Health and Safety at Work Act 
2015 (HSWA). Its general “so far as reasonably practicable” regime has been copied 
into the RA.88 Prosecutions could be taken under either, although they have only been 
taken under health and safety legislation to date. The RA extends the HSWA rules 
with more railway specific ones.  
The RA imposes a general duty on all rail participants,89 that they:90 
… must ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that none of [its] rail activities 
… causes, or is likely to cause, the death of, or serious injury to, individuals. 
Furthermore the first purpose of the Act is to:91 
(a) Promote the safety of rail operations by –  
(i) Stating the duty of rail participants to ensure safety. 
The penalty for breach of the s 7 duty is a $500,000 fine for a corporate.92 There 
is a corresponding duty on individuals, with a fine of $50,000, and/or 6 months 
imprisonment.93 Liability extends to employers and principals, and to directors.94 
                                                          
86 Section 2(1), definition of “rail service”.  
87 Railways Act 2005, s 4, definitions of “infrastructure owner” and “railway infrastructure”. Private 
sidings are now covered [RA]. 
88 Section 5. 
89 Section 4, definition of “rail participant” includes a wide range of bodies engaged in various aspects 
of the railway business. 
90 Section 7(1). 
91 Section 3. 
92 Section 61(1)(b). 
93 Sections 7(2) and 61(1)(a). 
94 Sections 65 and 66. 
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The licensing regime continued,95 and compliance with it became expressed as a 
duty.96 The right of revocation was clarified,97 but specific fines were also provided 
for. 
In order to get or maintain a licence, an operator must now submit (and have 
approved) a “safety case”.98  The list of what must be included is 13 paragraphs long, 
with additional subparagraphs.99 Amongst the matters the safety case has to cover are 
safety policy and objectives, management and organisation arrangements to promote 
safety, systems to assess risk and control it, arrangements to ensure assets and working 
practices are fit for purpose, safety critical tasks are identified, training and 
competence is up to scratch, staff are fit for duty and not impaired, and monitoring and 
reporting of safety issues. The list makes no distinction between the infrastructure and 
operations. 
This is a significant obligation not shared by road. KiwiRail’s Safety Case is nearly 
70 pages long.100 It may not be varied without further approval.101 A variation may be 
compelled by NZTA, which is responsible for oversight of rail safety.102 Compliance 
with it is subject to audits, called “safety assessments”,103 as part of the wider 
assessment as to whether the safety obligations are being met.104 
There is a long list of matters that the Minister can make rules about, which is new 
in this Act.105 So far no significant rules have been made for standard railways,106 but 
the scope of the powers to make rules does stress the overall desire to closely supervise 
railway safety.  
Railways ceased to be an independent private concern in 2008 (earlier for 
infrastructure) and reverted to public ownership, as a state-owned enterprise. As noted 
above, one of the reasons for the intensive safety supervision of rail was the separation 
from government ownership, but this was not reversed when public ownership was 
resumed.  
Railways are also subject to the Transport Accident Investigation Commission’s 
(TAIC) scrutiny of accidents and incidents.107 Incidents are occurrences without 
                                                          
95 Section 15. 
96 Section 11. 
97 Section 24. 
98 Section 29. 
99 Section 30. 
100 KiwiRail Safety Case 2013. 
101 RA, s 32. 
102 Section 34. 
103 Part 2, Subpart 4. 
104 Section 40. 
105 Part 2, Subpart 5. 
106 The Railways Regulations 2008 cover exemptions for some tourist lines, mining and forestry 
railways, and fees. 
107 Transport Accident Investigation Commission [TAIC] Railway Occurrence Reports, various dates. 
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casualties, but which expose people to risk and which may be precursors to 
accidents.108 TAIC “determine[s] the circumstances and causes of accidents and 
incidents with a view to avoiding similar occurrences in the future”.109 While they do 
not “ascribe blame”110 they do make recommendations, and monitor rail companies’ 
actions on them.111 No aspect of road activity is subject to TAIC’s scrutiny.112 
D International Comparisons 
The rules for railway safety responsibility are consistently strict across the three 
jurisdictions studied, and are similar to those in New Zealand. 
In Australia a model Railway Safety National Law has been passed in all 
jurisdictions except Queensland.113 The law is in the schedule to the Rail Safety 
National Law (South Australia) Act 2012 (SA). Its objects include effective 
management and control of rail risks, safe operations, continuous improvement of rail 
safety, and the promotion of public confidence in safe rail passenger and freight 
transport.114  It requires risks to be eliminated so far as reasonably practicable, or to 
minimise them if elimination is not possible.115 “Reasonably practicable” is defined in 
the same terms116 as in the Australian Model Work Health and Safety Act, including 
the cost of avoiding the risk needing to be “grossly disproportionate to the risk”.117 
Duties are placed on rail operators, infrastructure providers, rolling stock 
operators, designers, manufacturers, suppliers, installers, and freight loaders to ensure 
safety as far as reasonably practicable.118 These duties are not confined to employees 
or to a workplace, but are of general application. Safety covers workers, passengers, 
crossing users, other users, and the general public.119  
The model law provides for a system of compulsory accreditation of railway 
operators.120 This involves having a safety management system, similar to the New 
                                                          
108 RA, s 4(1), definition of “incident”. 
109 Transport Accident Commission Act 1990, s 4 [TAICA]. 
110 Section 4. 
111 TAIC “Outstanding Safety Recommendations”, www.taic.org.nz. 
112 TAICA, s 13. 
113 Rail Safety National Law (South Australia) Act 2012 (SA), Rail Safety (Adoption of National Law) 
Act 2012 (NSW), Rail Safety (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2012 (NT), Rail Safety National Law 
(Tasmania) Act 2012 (Tas), Rail Safety National Law Application Act 2013 (Vic), Rail Safety National 
Law (ACT) Act 2014 (ACT), Rail Safety National Law (WA) Act 2015 (WA). See Office of the 
National Rail Safety Regulator <www.onrsr.com.au>. 
114 Rail Safety National Law (Aust) (Schedule to Rail Safety National Law (South Australia) Act 2012 
(SA), s 3. 
115 Section 46. 
116 Apart from deleting references to “health”. 
117 Rail Safety National Law (Aust), s 47; Model Work Health and Safety Act (Aust), s 18.  
118 Sections 52–54. 
119 Section 4, definition of “safety”. 
120 Section 62. 
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Zealand safety case.121 This system has to cover compliance with risk management 
obligations, identify and assess safety risks, specify the controls for managing them, 
and include procedures for monitoring, reviewing, and revising those controls. It also 
needs to include plans for health and fitness, drug and alcohol management, and 
fatigue management.122  There are fines of up to $500,000 for not having any of these 
or not implementing them.123 The system must be implemented and complied with 
(without reasonable excuse), or face fines of up to $1.5 million.124 
This is a very extensive and far reaching law (over 140 pages and 265 sections 
long), giving tight regulation of the rail industry throughout Australia. While framed 
in risk management terms, it does give the regulator wide powers to control rail safety. 
Even though some of its provisions relate to the equivalent of driver and vehicle on 
roads, the contrast with the minimal regulation of road infrastructure is stark. 
A federal law, the Railway Safety Act, applies to railways in Canada.125 As in 
Australia, this too is an extensive statute. Its objectives also include the safety and 
security of workers and the public, as well as the protection of property and the 
environment. It also relies on safety management systems,126 which have to cover 
similar matters to those in Australia and New Zealand.127 Fines of up to $1 million can 
be imposed against a corporation for breaches of the act.128 
In 1993 the Railways Act 1993 (UK) transferred all rail safety regulation to the 
Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (UK).129 Railway coverage was initially 
administered by the same body as for all industries, the Health and Safety Executive, 
but was later transferred to ORR.130 Coverage included the general public, whether or 
not passengers, as well as employees and oversight of construction and operation of 
systems and vehicles.131 Specialist regulations complement the general Act.132  
Thus in Britain the railway system is subject to the stringent “ensuring” safety “as 
far as reasonably practicable” standard, covering both employees and others.133  
                                                          
121 Section 64. 
122 Section 99. 
123 Sections 112–116. 
124 Section 101. 
125 Railway Safety Act RSC 1985 c 32 (4th Supp). 
126 Section 3. A “safety management system” is defined in s 4 as “a formal framework for integrating 
safety into day–to-day railway operations and includes safety goals and performance targets, risk 
assessments, responsibilities and authorities, rules and procedures, and monitoring and evaluation 
processes”. 
127 Railways Safety Management System Regulations SOR/2001-37, reg 2. 
128 Section 41. 
129 Railways Act 1993 (UK), s 117(1). 
130 Railways Act 2005 (UK), s 2. 
131 Schedule 3, cl 2. 
132 Principally the Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) Regulations 2006 (UK). 
133 Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 (UK), ss 2(1) and 3(1). 
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IV Conclusion 
New Zealand local roads are covered by a specific safety duty, but not the more 
heavily used state highways. On the other hand rail is subject to specific and intensive 
safety obligations, which are actively monitored and enforced. Internationally the 
situation for rail is similar, as it is for road in some jurisdictions. However, other 
jurisdictions have imposed safety obligations on roads, which while an advance on 
those in New Zealand, are still subject to restrictions and qualifications that do not 
apply to the rail safety rules. 
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Chapter Four: Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 
I Introduction 
Safety on road and rail might be thought to be covered by health and safety legislation, 
just as all other parts of the economy are. Work is required to produce both, and 
deficiencies in that work can cause harm. In most industries that would create a 
liability under the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 (HSWA). However, while it is 
clear that the HSWA does cover railways,1 it is less clear that it covers roads in the 
sense of the actual roading infrastructure. If it did cover roads, the safety discipline 
would become much stricter, and have a higher priority, than at present. That should 
lead to improved safety performance and fewer casualties. 
This Chapter explores whether the HSWA does cover roads and roading 
authorities. While the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 (HSEA) has been 
superseded, jurisprudence on it will be considered where relevant, as it is likely to be 
used in HSWA cases, especially where the wording is similar in each.  
II Not Public Safety Legislation 
Coverage of roading would give the HSWA a “public safety” role, and it has been 
argued that on a purposive interpretation that its predecessor the HSEA did not have 
that role.2 Its purpose was to protect workers from harm and only incidentally to 
protect those around the work place, such as members of the public.3 Nor is health and 
safety legislation “directed at general product liability” once work has finished.4  
The same is purported to be true of the Australian Model Bill and Act (“Model 
Act”)5, and so the HSWA which is based on it. “The [Australian Model] Bill is not 
intended to extend such protection in circumstances that are not related to work”. 
Harm has to be work related, although those harmed need not be workers.6 The Model 
Act “is not intended to have operation in relation to public health and safety more 
broadly, without the necessary connection to work”.7 A review preceding the Model 
                                                          
1 Railways Act 2005, s 8 [RA]. For example, see Worksafe New Zealand v KiwiRail Holdings Ltd [2015] 
NZDC 18904.  
2 Department of Labour v Berryman [1996] DCR 121 at 132 and 135. 
3 Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992, s 5 [HSEA]. 
4 Inspector Campbell v James Gordon Hitchcock [2004] NSWIRComm 87 at [304], cited in Telstra v 
Smith [2008] FCA1859 (Middleton J) at [26]. [Telstra Middleton J]. 
5 Model Work Health and Safety Bill (Aust) (revised draft 23 June 2011) Safe Work Australia 
<www.safeworkaustralia.gov.au>. This is variously called a Bill and an Act. In this dissertation it is 
referred to as an Act, following the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 [HSWA] usage, except where 
direct quotations use “Bill”.  
6 Safe Work Australia, “Explanatory Memorandum – Model Work Health and Safety Bill”, at [60] 
<www.safeworkaustralia.gov.au>. 
7 At [61]. 
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Act was at pains to recommend to limit the application of occupational health and 
safety (OHS) laws to public safety, by drafting the Act to “avoid giving it a reach that 
is inconsistent with” “protection of all persons from work related harm”.8 But 
according to Johnstone and Tooma, “[t]he drafting of the Model Act does not, 
however, reflect any such caution. On its language it applies to public health and safety 
as much as traditional workplace health and safety situations.”9 They observe that 
“where work ends and public health and safety begins is not easily ascertainable in a 
modern work context”.10 
The non-application to public safety is not, in any case, an inescapable 
interpretation. In England and Wales, the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1972 
(UK) is the principal safety regulation instrument for railways and has been extended 
to cover their public safety aspects,11 albeit now administered for “railway purposes” 
by a specialist rail body.12 It could be possible to do the same in New Zealand, and 
thus not have the complication of the same duties as the HSWA being repeated in the 
Railways Act.13 It could also be extended in a similar manner to cover roading. 
The Australian Review’s desire to limit the scope of the Model Act has to be 
tempered by the need to cover third parties against work-related harm. Even in their 
report they include “all persons”, so it is inevitable that some public safety is included, 
as it is in ss 3(1)(a) and 36(2) of the HSWA. The “core issue” according to the review 
is “not whether OHS laws should protect public safety … but how wide the protection 
should be”.14 The key question is how close the connection with work is in time and 
space. Hence road safety in the sense of road user behaviour would not be expected to 
be covered by OHS laws (leaving aside the vehicle itself as a workplace),15 but it is 
not so clear that work activities in building and maintaining a road are automatically 
excluded.  
III Key Sections 
This part considers key sections of the Act, and examines them to see how far they 
might apply to roads, and how that differs from the application to rail. 
                                                          
8 Australian Government,  National Review into Model Occupational Health and Safety Laws, Second 
Report to the Workplace Relations Minister’s Council (Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 
January 2009) Rec 77 at 26, and discussion at 18–26 [Second Review Report]. 
9 Richard Johnstone and Michael Tooma, Work Health and Safety Regulation in Australia. - The 
Model Act (Federation Press, Sydney, 2012), at 16. 
10 Johnstone and Tooma, above n 9, at 90. 
11 Railways Act 1993 (UK), s 117. Railtrack plc v Smallwood [2001] EWHC 78 (Admin), [2001] ICR 
714 discusses the public safety aspects of a prohibition order. 
12 Railways Act 2005 (UK), s 2. 
13 RA, ss 5, 7 and 9. 
14 Second Review Report, above n 8, at 25.  
15 HSWA s 20(2)(a). 
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A Reasonably Practicable, s 22. 
Section 22 defines “reasonably practicable” to mean what could reasonably be done 
in the light of likelihood and consequence of a risk, what was or ought to have been 
known about it, how it might be minimised or eliminated, and cost.  It is the cost 
element that creates a significant difference between road and rail. It requires a “gross 
disproportion” between costs and benefits before costs outweigh safety factors.16 This 
factor was part of the common law but is now made explicit.17 “Grossly 
disproportionate” is not defined in the Act, nor has it been judicially defined,18 but 
“grossly” does not admit of a small difference. 
This has been applied to rail only recently, and never to road. The Land Transport 
Act 1993 defined a cost as reasonable “if the value of the cost to the nation [was] 
exceeded by the value of the resulting benefit to the nation”.19 This is much the same 
as the current perspective on road infrastructure spending on safety. At the time, rail 
was also only expected to achieve safety at reasonable cost, through its safety system,20 
and the stricter standards of the HSEA did not apply if rail complied with the safety 
system.21 This proved contentious and was repealed after a Ministerial Inquiry.22 
Both the Land Transport Act provisions and the primacy of rail’s safety system 
have been repealed.23 Rail safety became much stricter, but the safety criterion for 
road infrastructure has relaxed.24 In practice, as discussed in Chapter One, road still 
takes a cost-benefit approach like the “reasonable cost” one, in which a project is 
worthwhile if the ratio of benefits to cost exceeds one. 
Rail operators are now compelled to prioritise safety by the high standard of 
“reasonably practicable”, including the “grossly disproportionate” ratio. Economists 
commenting on railway safety have pointed out the distortionary impact of this rule. 
It effectively mandates projects with benefit: cost ratios less than one (one would be 
“proportionate” in their eyes).25 Thus for industries subject to the HSWA, it might be 
                                                          
16 HSWA s 22(e).  
17 Edwards v National Coal Board [1949] 1 KB 704 (CA) at 712. Department of Labour v De Spa DC 
Christchurch CRI-30090213/93 8 October 1993. See Johnstone and Tooma, above n 9, at 71–73. 
18 Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator Meaning of Duty to Ensure Safety So Far as is 
Reasonably Practicable Guideline (Adelaide 2014) at 12 [ONRSR]. 
19 Land Transport Act 1993, s 16(2). Re-enacted in the Land Transport Act 1998, s 189(2). 
20 Transport Services Licensing Act 1989, s 6C(b) [TSLA]. There was a similar approach for aircraft 
and ships, now covered by HSWA ss 9 and 10.  
21 TSLA s 6H. 
22 WM Wilson QC Report of the Ministerial Inquiry into Tranz Rail Occupational Safety and Health 
(Wellington, August 2000). 
23 By, respectively, the Land Transport Amendment Act 2004, s 11; and RA, Schedule 1.  
24 The Land Transport Act provisions were replaced by even softer, more general provisions in the Land 
Transport Management Act 2003 [LTMA], ss 3 and 68(1), as amended by the Land Transport 
Management Amendment Act 2004. The equivalent provisions in the LTMA today are its purpose, s 3, 
and the New Zealand Transport Agency’s functions, s 94. 
25 Andrew W Evans “The economics of railway safety” (2013) 43 Research in Transportation 
Economics 137 at 141 and 142.   
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necessary to spend $3 or even $10 to achieve a safety benefit worth $1, to comply with 
the Act.26  
B Workplace, s 20 
The principal case on whether a road is a place of work (now a “workplace”) is 
Department of Labour v Berryman.27 Mr Berryman was charged under the HSEA in 
relation to a beekeeper (not a Berryman employee) who died when his vehicle fell 
through a suspension bridge that Mr Berryman owned. The prosecution alleged that 
the bridge was a place of work, and had been allowed to decay and become unsafe. If 
this prosecution had been successful then it would have opened up liability for road 
owners generally, as it would have been difficult to distinguish a bridge from another 
deficient part of a road.  
The definition of workplace in the HSWA is similar to that in the HSEA. For a 
road to be a workplace, it now needs to meet the HSWA definition: 
20 Meaning of workplace 
(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, a workplace— 
(a) means a place where work is being carried out, or is customarily carried 
out, for a business or undertaking; and    
(b) includes any place where a worker goes, or is likely to be, while at work. 
(2) In subsection (1), place includes— 
(a) a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, ship, or other mobile structure; and 
(b) any waters and any installation on land, on the bed of any waters, or 
floating on any waters. 
A place includes “any installation on land” which would include a road. A road is 
clearly a workplace for an employee when that person is in fact working on it, for 
example, repairing or maintaining it. Mr Berryman was not at the time working on the 
bridge. The judge thus focussed on the “customarily works” element of the HSEA 
definition (similar to HSWA s 20(1)(a)). In his view “customarily” “denotes some 
degree of frequency rather than mere intermittent activity over a number of years”.28 
He agreed that “the carrying out of maintenance work on a structure on an intermittent 
basis does not mean that the structure could be a ‘place of work’ for all time”.29 Nor 
did mere responsibility for maintenance mean it became a place of work. As regards 
Mr Berryman, then, the bridge was not a place of work. By the same reasoning, 
periodic maintenance on a road would not make it a workplace with respect to the road 
                                                          
26 ONRSR, above n 18, at 12. 
27 Berryman, above n 2. 
28 At 132. 
29 At 132. 
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owner, if work was not actually being done at the time. As well, a person 
“customarily” working involves an element of frequency – repetitive working over the 
course of a year, for example. Random repairs or maintenance are unlikely to be 
“customarily” enough to bring it into the definition.  
The beekeeper’s crossing of the bridge was to be brief, and the judge thought that 
“place” connoted one “where a person is working in more than a transitory sense”. 
“Merely passing while at work” was not enough. The HSEA was amended to remove 
the transitory point, by including “any place a person moves through”,30 but a 
transitory argument might still appeal on the HSWA wording in s 20(1)(b). 
The way the wording of subsection (1)(a) is phrased reinforces the present nature 
of the work – “is being” carried out, not “has been” or “will be” nor even simply “is”. 
This definition is slightly different from the Australian Model Act, s 8, as the definition 
uses the Review Committee’s stronger emphasis on the present tense, adding “being”, 
rather than simply “is carried out”.31 That committee specifically thought making a 
place a workplace at all times to be undesirable.32 This is however not the 
interpretation of the Model Act by Safe Work Australia.33 Tooma though is firm that 
workplace is limited to the present tense.34 The present tense of the definition makes 
it unlikely that it would work for the potentially many years that could elapse between 
the design or construction of a road and a deficiency causing harm. This is discussed 
below. 
But on the reading in Berryman, a person only has to own or occupy (now “manage 
or control”)35 a workplace, which can be a workplace by virtue of another party’s work 
there, and does not have to be his or her own workplace.36 HSWA s 37(1) is still open 
to this reading. So the road could be made into a workplace by its user being in a work-
related vehicle and the roading authority therefore made liable under s 37.37 
A recent Australian case extends the “workplace” tantalisingly close to one that 
might include roads – but stops short. It provides some extension to the “transitory” 
interpretation in Berryman. In Telstra Corporation Ltd v Smith38  a pedestrian fell into 
                                                          
30 HSEA s 2(3) substituted by the Health and Safety in Employment Amendment Act 2002, s 4(12).  
31 Second Review Report, above n 8, Recommendation 94, at 98. Changes in the House reinforced the 
HSWA section’s present tense focus. In the first draft of the Bill the clause simply read “where work is 
carried out”, a formulation less clearly limited to the present tense: Health and Safety Reform Bill 2014 
(192-1), cl 15.  
32 At 97. 
33 Safe Work Australia, above n 6, at [48]-[50]. 
34 Michael Tooma, Tooma’s Annotated Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Lawbook, Sydney 2012), at 
25. 
35 HSWA, s 37. 
36 Berryman, above n 2, at 131. 
37 The Select Committee report on the 2002 HSEA amendment recognised that a road could be a place 
of work for the vehicle owner. Health and Safety in Employment Amendment Bill 2001 (163-2) 
(Commentary) at 4. 
38 Telstra v Smith [2009] FCAFC 103, (2009) 177 FCR 577; (Full Court) [Telstra FC]. 
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a Telstra-owned manhole when its cover collapsed, and was injured. Telstra 
challenged a finding of liability under the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1991 
(Cth), s 17,39 which was similar to HSWA s 37.  
The question was whether the manhole cover was a workplace, which was very 
generally defined essentially as a place where contractors or employees worked.40 
Applying the logic in Berryman one might think that the interaction with the manhole 
cover by both Telstra and the injured party was too transitory for Telstra to be liable. 
Clearly the injured party would have been “at” (on) the manhole cover only very 
briefly, if it had not collapsed. The last time the pit was used by Telstra (by a 
contractor) was over two months before the accident.41  
Telstra in fact contended at first instance that to be a workplace, work had to be 
going on at the time.42 They also referred to the objects of the Act, which included 
protection to third parties “arising out of the activities of such employees at work”.43 
They referred to a number of cases where work on infrastructure was intermittent, and 
because of that the relevant places were not workplaces at all times. It was argued that 
there was a “temporal”44 aspect to the definition.45 In one of these cases:46  
[n]or could the fact that at one time, the defendant had there performed work on 
the pipes, thereafter make that place the defendant’s place of work.  
The situation with a road is closely analogous. In fact, on appeal the Full Court 
commented that “[t]here is no reason to think that an employer is not liable under s 17 
if an employee creates a dangerous situation in the workplace whilst at work and the 
non-employee is injured after the employee has ceased work”.47 This is on all fours 
with a deficiency in a road causing an injury in the absence of road authority 
employees, at least where the deficiency is caused by an employee’s action, for 
example design. 
“There is no need to give workplace a meaning which requires a temporal 
connection between the place or premises and the work to be performed.”48 The 
manhole is designed only to enable work to be done. “There is no reason to limit a 
workplace to a place where work is being performed at any particular time. A 
                                                          
39 At [12].  
40  Occupational Health and Safety Act 1991 (Cth), s 5; Telstra FC, above n 38, at 585. 
41 Telstra FC, above n 38, at [16]. 
42 Telstra Middleton J, above n 4, at [19]. 
43  Telstra Middleton J, above n 4, at [20] – judge’s emphasis. 
44 Telstra FC, above n 38, at [47].  
45 See WorkCover Authority of NSW (Inspector Paine) v Boral John Perry Industries Pty Limited t/as 
Boral Elevators (unreported, Industrial Relations Commission NSW, 8 August 1996) and WorkCover 
Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Maltby) v AGL Gas Networks Limited [2003] NSWIRComm 
370, both analysed in Telstra Middleton J, above n 4, at [22]–[29]. 
46 AGL, above n 45, at [168], quoted in Telstra Middleton J above n 4 at [28]. 
47 Telstra FC, above n 38, at [55]. 
48 At [49]. 
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workplace is a place where work is performed from time to time”.49 Even a woolshed 
used only a few weeks in the year remains a workplace outside those times.50  
In a recent New Zealand case,51  a place of work was interpreted clearly in the 
present tense, where work is being carried out. It “can only be a place where a 
reasonable person would appreciate that work is being undertaken”, as shown by signs 
or “other external indications”.52 In that case, the work place was limited to the actual 
site on the house where the roofing work was being done (along with relevant 
scaffolding).53 The adjacent driveway where the person was injured was not in the 
place of work. This analysis applies even more strongly under the HSWA definition 
of “workplace” (HSWA), with its “being carried out” wording. 
On this analysis a road is not a workplace for the authority unless some physical 
work is actually going on at the time. 
In HSWA, s 20(1)(b), there is a potentially prospective phrase, “is likely to be”. 
This would be likely to cover the Telstra situation,54 but not help with the roading 
issue, as a roading authority employee might be unlikely to visit a particular section 
of road very often, so is not “likely” to be there. A vehicle can be a workplace55 and 
so for work use of a vehicle, a road is also likely to be a workplace under s 20(1)(b), 
since that is a “place where a worker goes”. The language of the HSEA s 2(3), about 
a place a “person moves through”, has been dropped. 
The distinction between a road and a railway is that the road is intended to be used 
by third parties, without the presence of an employee of the roading authority. While 
its deficiencies may be the result of work (or inaction) by such an employee, he or she 
is not present at the time a deficiency causes problems. On the other hand, rail 
activities with third parties (for example passengers) usually involve a railway staff 
member (or a contractor), and the railway is readily made liable under the HSWA.  
There may be circumstances where the affected party on a railway is in a similar 
position to a road user. Where track is provided by one railway for another rail operator 
to use (as occurs with suburban and rail enthusiast trains), a situation analogous to a 
road might arise. That is, a latent deficiency of the track caused by its owner’s staff 
might harm one of the second operator’s staff or passengers long after the deficiency 
was caused, and the nexus between the incident and the track owner’s staff could be 
                                                          
49 At [49]. 
50 At [50]. 
51 Alliance Roof Solutions Ltd v Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment [2014] NZHC 2625, 
(2014) 12 NZELR 204. 
52 At [41]. 
53 At [56(a)]. 
54 Telstra FC, above n 38. 
55 HSWA, s 20(2)(a). 
 
                      52 
 
as remote as on road. In this situation the track owner could also claim (if prosecuted 
under the HSWA) that the site of the incident was not a workplace (with respect to it). 
However the provisions of the Railways Act 2005 (RA) do not rely on the 
workplace point, and the track owner would probably be liable for not ensuring safety 
“as far as reasonably practicable”.56 Section 7 makes it clear that coverage is not 
limited to workers or incidental activities related to work, but to the function of 
operating a railway57 and the safety of all individuals. Section 9(1) puts duties to keep 
all individuals safe on all persons on the railway, not just staff. These sections are 
reinforced by one of the purposes of the RA in s 3(a)(i), to ensure safety of rail 
operations, not just the safety of those working for the railway. This is clearly one 
reason for having a separate railway safety Act, even though its duties mirror those in 
the HSWA. 
The same gap exists with respect to roading, but there is no Roads Act to fill it. 
C PCBU duty to third parties, s 36(2) 
Section 36(2) provides that a person conducting a business or undertaking (PCBU): 
 … must ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that the health and safety of 
other persons is not put at risk from work carried out as part of the conduct of the 
business or undertaking. 
A road is designed, built, and maintained as part of the “conduct of the business or 
undertaking”. If any of these things are deficiently done, then prima facie that could 
cause harm and the roading authority may not have done all that was reasonably 
practicable to prevent it. Note that failure to do something is equally culpable under 
the section as doing something badly. Nor is there any temporal restriction in the 
wording of this section. As long as the risk flows from the “conduct of the business” 
then the duty applies. It does not have to be an immediate consequence of a particular 
action or inaction. 
As with the similar HSEA s 15, this has no locational constraints – harm caused 
anywhere by work will be caught. As long as the work is “carried out” [somewhere] 
“as part of the … undertaking”, it is caught. Nor would an objection that roading is 
not a business succeed – it is clearly an undertaking (and even the fact it is not required 
to make a profit is irrelevant).58 Section 36(2) reflects the Australian reform 
committee’s view that some interpretations of “workplace” had limited its scope. They 
                                                          
56 RA, s 5 
57 Including its infrastructure: RA, s 4(3). 
58 HSWA, s 17(1)(a)(ii).  
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thought that any activity and consequence “resulting from the conduct of the business 
or undertaking” should be caught.59  
There are subtle differences in wording between s 36(2) and HSEA s 15. The latter 
section focuses on the employee’s action or inaction “while at work”. HSWA s 36(2) 
focuses on “work carried out”. While the HSEA section arguably has no temporal 
constraint, the HSWA section appears even clearer in this regard. Work carried out at 
any time or in any place could put a person at risk at any other time or place. Clause 
36(2) may well create obligations on roading authorities. 
In R v Mara60 the English Court of Appeal considered the “third party” provision 
in their health and safety legislation. An employee of another company used and was 
killed by faulty equipment owned by Mara’s company for its business. Mara allowed 
employees of the first company to use it, without any of Mara’s employees being 
present. The equipment was simply left for the employees of the other company to 
use.   
The court held that Mara was rightly convicted and dismissed the appeal. The 
United Kingdom section imposed a duty to ensure “that persons not in his employment 
who may be affected thereby are not thereby exposed to risks to their health or 
safety”.61  It corresponds to HSWA s 36(2). The provision would arguably apply to 
those who provide roads that affect others and expose them to risk. As noted, it does 
apply to railways for all purposes in the United Kingdom, including public safety.  
 In an Australian case preceding the Model Bill it was held that an undertaking was 
still being conducted when a scaffolding blew down even though work on erecting it 
had finished.62 The intervening period was however short, and the principle may not 
extend to a roading situation. Foster notes a case where an authority responsible for 
approving the construction of a structure was held liable under health and safety laws 
for its collapse some years later, injuring third parties. He observes that today the 
prosecution would likely have been under the Model Law equivalent of s 36(2).63 A 
prosecution would be possible “so long as the ‘causal chain’ between the business or 
undertaking and the harm was not too long”.64 He means long in the sense of remote, 
                                                          
59 Australian Government, National Review into Model Occupational Health and Safety Laws, First 
Report to the Workplace Relations Minister’s Council (Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra 
October 2008) Recommendation 17, at 72. 
60 R v Mara [1987] 1 WLR 87 (CA). 
61 Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (UK), s 3(1). 
62 Inspector Maltby v Harris Excavations and Demolition Pty Ltd (Industrial Relations Commission 
of New South Wales, Cahill VP, 2 May 1997). Cited in Richard Johnstone, Elizabeth Bluff and Alan 
Clayton, Work Health and Safety Law and Policy, (3th ed, Lawbook, Sydney 2012), at 225-226. 
63 Neil Foster Workplace Health and Safety Law in Australia (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, Sydney 
2012), at 369; citing R v Mayor, Councillors, and Citizens of the City of Dandenong and Noel Bailey 
(County Court of Victoria, Stott J, 8 November 1991); facts set out in Director of Public Prosecutions 
Ref No 1 of 1992 [1992] 2 VR 405 (VCCA). 
64 Foster, above n 63, at 368. 
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many links in the chain, but the same comment probably applies to long in time. There 
is a clear analogy to road work – the authority does work (or should have) and 
sometime after an accident occurs that can be attributable to that work (or inaction). 
A further avenue of escape for a roading authority might be whether its actions or 
inactions can be said to create risks to someone. Tooma notes that the Model Law 
equivalent is broad, but nevertheless there has to be “sufficient proximity to the person 
which makes the possibility of danger real and not too remote or fanciful”.65 
“Proximate” here again appears to mean close in causation terms, not necessary in 
time. The concern with this dissertation is that even obvious lapses by a roading 
authority attract no sanction, and borderline causality is not of critical importance. 
D Section 37 
This section provides: 
37 Duty of PCBU who manages or controls workplace 
(1) A PCBU who manages or controls a workplace must ensure, so far as is 
reasonably practicable, that the workplace … and anything arising from the 
workplace are without risks to the health and safety of any person. 
… 
Again, if a road is a workplace, then this would impose a duty with respect to road 
users. A road authority owns the road so would control it. It controls the road not only 
in the sense of how it is made and maintained, but also in the case of New Zealand 
Transport Agency, controls those who use it, through licensing, and through its 
contract with the Police for enforcement of road rules. 
But the duty need not require the road itself to be a workplace. The office where 
decisions are taken on design, construction, and maintenance is clearly a workplace, 
and the decisions fall within “anything arising from the workplace”. This might be 
narrowly interpreted to cover only the direct risks of anything physical arising, like 
fumes or noise; but the section is not narrowly worded, and decisions certainly arise 
from a workplace. They may contain risks (albeit latent ones which might take some 
time to manifest themselves).66 This interpretation is reinforced by the specific 
coverage of design in s 39. 
Moreover the width of s 37 would cover policies, for example those on heavy 
vehicle mass and dimensions, which might have safety consequences independently 
of the road itself. This section could be an important tool in the safety management of 
                                                          
65 Michael Tooma, Tooma’s Annotated Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Lawbook, Sydney 2012), at 
42.  
66 For example, decisions on road markings – Re Angus George Johnson Donald, Coroners Court, 
Wellington, CSU-2014-WGN-000262, 7 December 2015, Coroner Evans. 
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roads – if not curtailed by a purposive interpretation that the context of the harm has 
to be a direct work context. The purpose of the Bill, as noted earlier, does include 
coverage of people who are not workers, on equal footing, in the same subsections.67 
Johnstone and Tooma note that the “Model Act is only intended to protect persons 
who are not workers from hazards and risks arising from work carried out as part of 
the business or undertaking”.68 Whether the risks arising from roading are as a result 
of work “carried out” should not be in doubt, but the HSWA now reads “being carried 
out”, which adds some doubt. 
They go on to note that the Model Act is not built round employment or 
workplaces. The primary duty (in s 36 of the HSWA):69 
is triggered by risks to all people – ‘workers’ and ‘others’ arising from work of 
any kind, carried out by all kinds of workers in all kinds of work arrangements 
for all kinds of business organisations. 
And:70 
The laws are not limited to workplaces and operate to capture any risk to health 
and safety arising from work in the conduct of any business or undertaking. 
They believe its scope to be so broad as to allow actions against tobacco companies 
for public health consequences.71 The harm arises from the work in making, 
distributing, and selling cigarettes, not from any direct impact of work in the narrow 
sense in the factory. On this reading, it should also apply to a roading organisation. 
Work in making and maintaining the road, if not properly done, gives rise to risks to 
safety. If the costs of avoiding those risks is high, just as it would be for a tobacco 
company, that is not relevant unless it is “grossly disproportionate”72 to the risk. 
There is a “farmers’” exception in s 37(3). The HSWA duties do not apply to a 
part of a farm unless work “is being carried out” there “at the time”. The wording of s 
37(3)(b)(ii) identifies the issue with respect to roads, that while they are a product of 
work, they may not be a workplace unless actual roading work is taking place: most 
of the time, work is not being carried out on roads. In farming terms, persons who are 
not working but who are injured by previous work not being adequately done (for 
example. on a farm bridge) or not done at all (such as no protection against falls from 
paths or structures) would not result in the farmer being liable. In roading terms, if 
such an exemption applied, persons (not working) injured by poor maintenance, 
construction or design equally might not have a case against roading authorities. But 
                                                          
67 HSWA, s 3(1)(a) and 3(2). 
68 Johnstone and Tooma, above n 9, at 62. Their emphasis. 
69 At 77. 
70 At 90. 
71 At 88–90. 
72 HSWA s 22(e). 
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the absence of a similar provision for roads implies that work does not have to be 
actually being carried out at the time for roads to be caught. 
Whether s 37 would make a road owner liable still ultimately turns on the 
definition of workplace, and while it is now arguable that a road is a workplace, it is 
likely to be looked at through the present tense and employment focussed lens of 
somebody working there. A roading authority is unlikely to be prosecuted, let alone 
convicted. 
E Specific Duties for Particular Work, ss 38-43 
Section 38 provides that a PCBU must “as far as reasonably practicable, ensure that 
… fixtures, fittings or plant … are without risks to … any person”. Similar phrases are 
included in ss 39 (design of plant, substances or structures),73 40 (manufacture), 41 
(imports), 42 (supply) and 43 (installation, construction, or commissioning).  They 
also extend the duty to those in the vicinity of a workplace. 
Sections 38-43 are inherently prospective, in that the actions of design, 
manufacture, and so on take place over a short time and then the risks from them run. 
They apply to structures “to be used” as or at a workplace.74 There appears to be no 
time limit on their application.  
Section 39 (design) in particular can only be prospective. There are no significant 
risks in the design process except those that result from deficiencies in the design itself, 
once built and used, so there is no point in having the section unless it is prospective 
in effect. The duty arises when the work is done, but the crystallisation of that duty 
may be a long way off in time. Nor is there much point if the design duty is limited to 
the workplace it was created in. By definition, it will be likely to be used in another 
place.  
This still requires that the structure is or is used at a workplace (or could reasonably 
be expected to be used).75 So if the road is a workplace for the roading authority, then 
the duty is clear. But if it is not a workplace for the authority, it is still arguably a 
workplace for many users who drive vehicles in the course of their work. Sections 39-
43 provide for a duty to be owed by persons in one workplace to those in another, of 
which a road could be an example. If the road itself is not a workplace, then for 
commercial vehicles, which are workplaces (including cars driven for work purposes), 
the designer and builder of the road could be caught by ss 39(2)(f) and 40(2)(f), which 
cover duties owed to those “at or in the vicinity of a workplace and who are exposed 
to the …structure” at the workplace.  
                                                          
73 A “structure” includes “anything that is constructed”, which would include a road: HSWA s 16.  
74 HSWA ss 39(1)(c), 40(1)(c), 41(1)(c), 42(1)(c), 43(1). 
75 HSWA s 39(1)(c).  
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Indeed s 39(2)(a) and s 40(2)(a) could be read in the same manner: the designer or 
manufacturer owes duties to those:76 
(a) Who, at a workplace, use the … structure for a purpose for which it was 
designed or manufactured.  
The vehicle is a workplace for some, and there is nothing to say that the structure 
referred to has to be part of the same workplace. While the drafters may have thought 
that the circumstances would usually involve a structure in the same workplace, they 
have not said so, and so have created a liability to ensure the safety of commercial 
users of the structure (road).  
This does however suffer from the disadvantage of only impacting on a subset of 
the vehicle users, and so is not of general application. Those using the road for non-
commercial purposes would not be covered, although the specific exemption for those 
using a facility for leisure is not carried over from HSEA s 16. It would be an 
unsatisfactory position to have the law only protect a part of those who use the road, 
and this may in itself indicate a forced reading of it. It would be much more satisfactory 
to make it clear that the duties are held in respect of all users, through a roading 
equivalent of the RA. 
F Personal Duty of Workers and All Persons to Others, ss 45, 46 
As well as the PCBU, any worker must take reasonable care to avoid adversely 
affecting their own and others’ safety.77 
The phrase “reasonable care” is not defined. It is arguably a lesser obligation than 
s 36’s duty to ensure safety “so far as is reasonably practicable”.78 It nevertheless is 
not limited by time, and a worker (widely defined)79 for a roading authority could be 
liable for careless acts or omissions. 
Under s 46, any person (including a PCBU or a worker) at a workplace has to take 
reasonable care to avoid harm to anyone else, inside or outside the workplace, and at 
any time. According to Foster, the Australian equivalent, s 29, is a new and untested 
provision, going beyond workplace safety into the area of public safety, though his 
examples are of members of the public who are in readily identifiable workplaces such 
as shopping centres or public libraries.80  
                                                          
76 Sections 40(2)(a); s 39(2)(a) are in similar terms. 
77 HSWA s 45. 
78 Foster, above n 63, at 410. 
79 HSWA s 19. 
80 Foster, above n 63, at 411. 
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IV Summary 
The HSWA applies to rail, but is not so clear that it applies to roads.  While a purposive 
argument could be made about restricting its application to situations closely linked to 
employment, it also includes a purpose to protect others (other than employees) within 
the first objective (which has been referred to as the “primary duty”).81 Its provisions 
are not all restricted to a workplace, and indeed the protection for “others” is expressed 
in wide terms. It is capable of supporting a prosecution of a roading authority, 
especially in relation to a work-use vehicle, though again the issue will be whether the 
authority will want to take that action. The authorities administering the HSEA have 
not taken action to prosecute roading authorities for road deficiencies under that Act, 
and it has been over 10 years since the HSEA was amended to counter the implications 
of Berryman.82 
                                                          
81 Section 3(1)(a). Johnstone and Tooma, above n 9, at 62. 
82 Berryman is discussed above at 48–50. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusions, Scenarios and Proposals for Reform 
I Introduction 
This dissertation has considered the relative safety burden on road and rail from a 
number of perspectives. The thesis is that there is a major difference in the way safety 
is treated for the two modes, a difference rooted in the law. Road and rail should be 
on an even footing to ensure each contributes to the economy most efficiently, with 
the least risk. The dissertation has sought to analyse this differential treatment, and to 
propose solutions. 
This chapter draws together the main conclusions and illustrates them by reference 
to scenarios. These scenarios are hypothetical, although some are based on actual 
events. Even if they are hypothetical, they are nevertheless realistic.  
The chapter then considers a number of proposals for reform, to better balance the 
safety treatment of road and rail. 
II The Scenarios 
The scenarios each take a different perspective on how safety might be affected, 
through physical deficiencies in the infrastructure, deficiencies in managing it, 
changes in fundamental parameters of operations, and ownership. They are all set in 
New Zealand, and New Zealand law applies. 
The prime focus of the dissertation is on road’s and rail’s functions as 
infrastructure owners, the interaction of people and vehicles with the infrastructure, 
and not on vehicle operation itself. The scenarios reflect this focus. They are: 
A Physical Deficiencies: Rock Falls, Holes, Slips and Similar Events. 
Scenario One: a large rock falls from the hillside by the road or railway line. It lands 
on a car or train and kills a passenger on a non-work trip.1 As a variation, the passenger  
was on a work trip. 
B Management Deficiencies: Signals and Signs, Speed Limits, Policies. 
Scenario Two: a person is killed because a speed limit for a particular section of road 
or railway has been carelessly set, in a general manner without regard to the particular 
dangers of that section. 
                                                          
1 The road scenario is based on the facts in In the matter of Heather Joy Thompson, Coroners Court, 
Hamilton, CSU-2014-HAM-000130, 25 September 2014, Coroner Ryan. 
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C Fundamental Changes in Operating Parameters for Vehicles Permitted on the 
Network. 
Scenario Three: The infrastructure owner establishes a new general policy on vehicle 
length. This is unsuited to some stretches of road or rail. On one such section a 
collision occurs because the vehicle cannot make its way around a bend without 
encroaching on an adjacent lane or track, with fatalities, serious injuries, and property 
damage. 
D Ownership: Does the Status as a Public or Private Body Matter? 
Scenario Four: Collisions kill people on a public road, a private road, and a railway 
line. Are the consequences different for each of the infrastructure owners just because 
of their ownership status? 
III  Summary and Conclusions 
The dissertation has considered road and rail safety and their relationship, and there 
are four broad conclusions: 
 The common law of negligence and nuisance has favoured road and continues 
to do so. It makes few concessions for rail. 
 Specific safety legislation in New Zealand applies with much greater force to 
rail than to road. 
 The New Zealand health and safety legislation clearly applies to rail 
infrastructure, but less clearly to road infrastructure, with a consequence that a 
much higher standard is applied to rail than road. 
 The differential also exists in the three main international jurisdictions 
reviewed: England and Wales, Australia and Canada, but in some it is less 
stark. 
A The Common Law Favours Road 
The law relating to highways has its roots many centuries ago in England. The local 
justices had a duty to see that the King’s subjects could pass freely. Local inhabitants 
had to maintain the roads, by contribution of labour and resources originally, but later 
by money. They could be indicted for failure to maintain them. While the indictment 
remained law until 1959, it was not much used after the mid 19th century. 
The liability to maintain roads was an absolute one. A party injured by the road 
could sue in nuisance or negligence for damages. However, because of the absolute 
nature of the nuisance liability, courts conceded an exemption for damage caused by 
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omission, for example, by a simple failure to repair, even by allowing a road to decay. 
This became entrenched as the “non-feasance” rule. Despite the liability for road 
maintenance being increasingly a statutory one, courts continued to exempt highway 
authorities for non-feasance, claiming that the statutes merely transferred the 
obligation on the people at large to a body like a council, which simply stood in the 
shoes of the citizens. Even in colonial countries like Australia and New Zealand, where 
the maintenance obligation for roads was only ever with local bodies, and not the 
citizenry at large, the rule was applied. Scenario One, rockfall on a road, would be 
protected by this rule, even if the roading authority could have done something to 
prevent it.  
The jurisprudence developed into a web of somewhat intricate and contradictory 
distinctions about what was non-feasance and what was misfeasance (an act of 
commission which was liable), what was repair or maintenance and what was not, and 
whether the authority concerned was acting as a highway authority or in some other 
capacity and not subject to the protection of the rule. The latter would be the likely 
position if the failure to set the right limit in Scenario Two was regarded as an 
omission, making the authority liable. If it was a positive act, the authority would be 
open to liability for misfeasance regardless of how the organisation’s function was 
looked at. 
The concept of highways being maintainable by the public at large was abolished 
in England and Wales in 1959, and with effect from 1964 the non-feasance rule was 
“abrogated” there for non-repair. But the courts have remained influenced by the 
historical rule, and have put restrictions around what exactly was abolished. There has 
been close focus on precisely what “non-repair” covered and what might lie outside 
that and thus still be covered by the rule. Repair was statutorily defined to include 
“maintenance” so that was clear, but beyond that some fine distinctions again came 
into play. The abrogation was held only to concern the fabric of the road and its 
surface. Removal of an obstruction was not repair. Nor was removal of ice and snow 
(since reversed by legislation). Nor was other material on the surface of the road, like 
mud and gravel, unless it had “bonded” with the surface. Nor was the absence of 
markings or signs.   
The non-feasance rule was partly justified in the cases by the fact that highways 
were publicly owned, community assets. Courts were disposed from early days to 
favour public bodies over private interest, even over the interest of users. The reasons 
included husbanding of scarce funds and concerns over the economic implications for 
public bodies of high standards, and justiciability concerns over courts’ competence 
to query policies and priorities. Public bodies could expect a less exacting standard 
than private ones. That could influence a decision on all the scenarios, for roads, but 
not for rail. 
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In the context of the continuing judicial restriction of the “abrogation” of the non-
feasance rule, it is not surprising that attempts were made to identify duties in the 
exercise of powers in other parts of the Highways Act 1980 (UK) or other laws, such 
as those concerning road safety. This has been suggested in Australia, and is the 
practice in British Columbia. But this has been unsuccessful in England and Wales. In 
2004 the House of Lords ruled out such an approach.2 Many duties in statutes were 
broad, “target”, duties owed to the public at large and which do not give individuals a 
right of action for breach of statutory duty. Performance of such duties can be subject 
to an authority’s resources and priorities. They are unlikely to give rise to a common 
law duty of care (supporting a claim for damages). Ultimately a road user should not 
rely on the authority for his or her safety, but on themselves. In Scenarios Two and 
Three this principle might allow the road authority to escape liability, but not the 
railway. Failure to carry out a function in either scenario would not give rise to a duty 
for road. 
A further argument in support of lower standards for road authorities was that of 
control – they had less control over users, through the open access requirement and 
users self-reliance. This attitude is still current in the courts, and is in fact built into 
the road safety law, which proceeds from the assumption of driver responsibility. Yet 
today the access to highways, at least for motor vehicles, is tightly controlled, and the 
driver is not necessarily in control of his or her destiny amongst other drivers, and with 
respect to road conditions. 
In Australia the non-feasance rule was trenchantly criticised in Brodie,3 which held 
that it should be abolished. Authorities, it said, had a duty to take reasonable care to 
ensure what they did or did not do did not create a foreseeable risk of harm. Most 
jurisdictions in Australia enacted legislation to restore the non-feasance rule. The case 
has been largely ignored. The rule still applies in New Zealand, although with accident 
compensation its impact is likely to be small. 
Although some early cases examined the idea that the railway might also enjoy an 
immunity for non-feasance, this was firmly rejected by the 1930s. All railways in 
Britain were privately owned until 1948, and so were never public bodies to which the 
non-feasance rule might have attached. The fact that their authority originated in 
statute was not enough. Because a railway company had not inherited its rights to the 
road from “the inhabitants at large” the historical position did not apply and so nor did 
the non-feasance rule. Railways have only ever been repairable by the incorporated 
owners. In fact, the rule did not even apply to a pier, rather closer in concept to a road 
than a railway.  
                                                          
2 Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] UKHL 15, [2004] 1 WLR 1057. 
3 Brodie v Singleton Shire Council [2001] HCA 29, (2001) 206 CLR 512. 
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Over time, many cases have been reported involving omissions by railways in a 
wide range of fact situations. For example, slips and falls on highways were protected 
by the rule, but not the same events on a platform or railway-owned access road. Most 
of the railway cases were concerned with occupiers’ liability. Such liability did not 
accrue to highways because of their open access nature; they were there for the public 
to use and their owners or controllers were never “occupiers” of the road in a legal 
sense. The fact that the railway was treated as an occupier for the purposes of liability 
is in itself a differential in treatment relative to roads.  
Failure to maintain a tunnel led to liability in an early New Zealand case. 
Maintenance of slopes above the railway (Scenario One) is a similar situation. In 2013 
the British railway infrastructure owner was held to have a duty of care to investigate 
and to minimise the consequences of road vehicle incursion onto railways. It had done 
nothing to prevent such an incursion, but non-feasance played no part in the decision.4  
These cases have all been regarded as open to a finding of negligence (or 
nuisance), although on the facts such a finding has not always been made. Omissions 
have also lead to health and safety prosecutions. In the first and second scenarios the 
railway would be likely to be liable. 
B Specific Road and Rail Legislation in New Zealand 
Since an amendment to the Local Government Act 1974 (LGA) in 1978 a duty 
formerly confined to road works has been widened beyond them, to give a duty on 
local authorities as roading authorities to take “all sufficient precautions” for safety. 
The extent of this provision is clear on its face, but some cases treat it as a power not 
a duty, and cases tend to be confined to road works sites. Scenario One should be 
covered by this section for a local road, although on English jurisprudence,5 an 
inspection plan with reasonable frequencies might satisfy the “all sufficient 
precautions” requirement of the LGA. 
There are many more kilometres of local road than state highways, managed by the 
New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA), but state highways are much more heavily 
trafficked, with nearly half of all traffic. It might be expected that there would be a 
safety obligation on them. From 1978 to 1989 all powers and duties of relevant 
sections of the LGA also applied to state highways, but from 1989 only the “rights and 
powers” applied, and not “duties”. Thus there are no direct safety obligations imposed 
on the owner of the state highways. Certainly, there is a general obligation to operate 
in a way that “contributes to an effective, efficient, and safe land transport system in 
                                                          
4 Gilman v UPS, Network Rail Infrastructure [2013] EWHC 2341 (QB). The railway was however not 
liable, because any investigation would have shown that defending against incursions was low priority. 
5 Bramwell v Shaw [1971 RTR 167 (QB); Wilkinson v City of York Council [2011] EWCA Civ 207; 
Gilman, above n 4. 
 
                      64 
 
the public interest”,6 but that is no more than a target obligation. Moreover, the 
objectives of “effective, efficient and safe” may be in conflict, and a court would 
probably find any argument about the objective non-justiciable. 
The NZTA is responsible for administering the road safety system through the 
supervision of “land transport documents” under the Land Transport Management Act 
2003, such as permits and licences. There are no rules about the safety of actual roads 
applying to the owners of these roads except rules on setting speed limits, and traffic 
control devices.  The speed limit rule could have been breached in Scenario Two, but 
the rule itself has no sanctions. 
The contrast with rail is stark. Railways in New Zealand were subject to regulation 
of safety standards in the 19th century, but later developed a self-regulatory system. 
The railway could be sued for negligence and was. In 1982 with the creation of the 
New Zealand Railways Corporation some general safety goals were added, but no 
specific or punishable duties. With the creation of New Zealand Rail Limited in 1990 
(a private company but owned by the state) a more comprehensive safety regime was 
introduced. The railway had to develop, get approved, and comply with a safety 
system, and there were extensive procedures to ensure compliance. At the time the 
safety standard was “reasonable cost”, the same as applied to road. Provided rail 
complied with its safety system, the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 
(HSEA) did not apply to it, again comparable to the position with road. 
With the Railways Act 2005 (RA) the health and safety standards were applied to 
rail. By that time the railway was a private company, although shortly beforehand the 
infrastructure had reverted to the Crown.7 The Act applied to infrastructure equally. 
Now the duty of rail was to take all reasonable steps to ensure safety, since modified 
by the Health and Safety at Work Act (HSWA) to ensuring, so far as reasonably 
practicable, that no death or serious injury is caused by rail activities. In all scenarios 
the RA would apply, and in all the railway would be liable.  
One of the purposes of the RA is to promote the duty to ensure safety. The Act 
provides for large fines and imprisonment. Employers, directors, and principals are 
liable. Compliance with the licensing regime is now a duty. An approved safety case 
is required, and there is a long list of matters to be covered. In scenarios 2 and 3, the 
safety system would apply. The RA imposes a significant obligation not shared by 
road. 
It is hard to find obligations on road owners to have and keep their assets safe to 
use. There are only general target obligations for the NZTA. On the other hand rail 
                                                          
6 Land Transport Management Act 2003, s 3. 
7 The whole undertaking was taken back by the Crown in 2008, and so the private company rationale 
for the control was no longer relevant, but it remained nevertheless. 
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obligations are extensive and onerous. In legislative terms at least there is a differential 
safety obligation between road and rail. 
C Health and Safety Law in New Zealand 
The New Zealand health and safety legislation clearly applies to rail infrastructure, but 
less clearly to road infrastructure, with a consequence that a much higher standard is 
applied to rail than road. 
It has been held that the HSEA does not apply to a bridge, and thus not to roads.8 
Although that Act was written in wide terms that suggest a road could be a workplace, 
on a purposive interpretation it was not. The HSEA did not have a public safety role, 
but was only to protect workers from harm. The same is likely to be true of the HSWA, 
although some of its provisions more strongly suggest coverage of roads.  
“Workplace” is a key issue. In the HSWA, this is a place where work is being 
carried out or is customarily carried out. A road is clearly a workplace for a road 
worker actually maintaining the road. However, the question is whether it remains a 
workplace when the worker is not there. While the road is a result of work, this might 
have been done months or years before, and the definition is very much in the present 
tense. This present tense focus was confirmed judicially for the HSEA, and the 
addition of “being” to the definition in the HSWA makes the present tense nature 
stronger. And road work is not frequent enough to meet “customarily carried out”, 
unless the facility is only designed as a workplace (which a road patently is not). Under 
the HSEA “intermittent” use was not enough, and “customarily” implies a greater 
frequency of use is necessary. 
As well, a road user’s occupation of a particular road space has been described as 
“transitory”, with the duration too short to meet the implications of a “place”. The 
HSEA was amended to remove this point, but the HSWA is less clear. A “transitory” 
argument may still appeal. On the other hand, if a place is a workplace for one person 
(say a person in a work vehicle), then it is a workplace for the purposes of duties on 
another person “who manages and controls” that workplace.  
The distinction between road and rail is that a road is intended to be used by third 
parties, without an employee of the roading authority being present. There is usually 
a rail employee present when an incident occurs, and so rail is readily caught. If there 
are cases of third party rail users that are analogous to road, the RA duties would 
remain as they do not make any use of “place”. In Scenarios One and Two, the road 
would most likely not be a workplace, but the railway would be, and the events would 
have been the result of “railway activities”, giving liability under the RA. 
                                                          
8 Department of Labour v Berryman [1996] DCR 121. 
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There is a clear duty to third parties (non-employees) in both the HSEA and 
HSWA. In the HSWA, s 36(2), there is a duty not to put “other persons” at risk from 
work carried out. Harm caused anywhere by the work will be caught - there are no 
location constraints. A person could also be prosecuted after he or she had left the 
work so long as the causal chain between the business and the harm is not too remote. 
There are Australian cases involving a considerable lapse of time, even years. 
The general duty on a person who manages and controls a workplace in the 
HSWA, s 37(1), includes ensuring that nothing arising from the workplace is without 
risk to anyone (in or out of the workplace). Thus an office, clearly a workplace, might 
be involved in creating a policy with safety implications. That policy would “arise” 
from the workplace without too forced a reading. The same is true of designs. This 
section could well apply to Scenario Three, for road.  
There are as well new specific duties in the HSWA for designers, manufacturers, 
importers, suppliers and installers of plant or structures (including a road). These 
parties must ensure that the plant is without risk to anyone at a workplace or in the 
vicinity. There is no doubt that a vehicle can be a workplace, and the structure (road) 
can affect it, even if the road itself is not a workplace. These are inherently prospective 
duties, not present ones. A design for example is largely without risk until actually 
built sometime later. The duty arises when the work is done, and crystallises later, 
potentially a lot later. 
On a purposive view even under the HSWA extending the coverage to public 
safety areas where there is no active employment at the time of an incident might 
stretch its employment focus too far. Such a view would leave roads out of its ambit, 
in all the scenarios.  It is however less clear than in the HSEA, as the HSWA’s first 
purpose is to protect both workers and “other persons” from harm from work. Some 
Australian commentators believe that their Model Act (which the HSWA is based on) 
does cover public safety. It may boil down to a willingness on the part of the 
administering authority to take such a wide view of the scope of the Act.  
Duties under the HSWA are subject to an “as far as is reasonably practicable” test, 
and in particular to the relationship of the costs of dealing with the risk, whether the 
cost is “grossly disproportionate” to the risk. This rule effectively mandates 
expenditure where the benefit: cost ratio of less than one (one would be 
“proportionate”). Thus for industries subject to the HSWA, it might be necessary to 
spend $3 or even $10 to achieve a safety benefit worth $1, to comply with it. On the 
other hand, roading expenditure is evaluated on the basis of achieving benefits that 
exceed costs. Thus rail has a financial burden not shared by road, unless road 
authorities become actively subject to the Act. 
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D The Differential Also Exists in Other Common Law Jurisdictions. 
The current Highways Act 1980 (UK) provides a framework for the liability of road 
authorities in England and Wales. That act provides a duty to maintain. In an action 
for damage from failure to maintain, roading authorities have a special “reasonable 
care” defence available to them. In deciding on whether reasonable care has been 
taken, courts are to take account of reasonable maintenance standards and other 
criteria. This statutory duty to maintain is often the subject of court action, and can 
result in an award of damages for personal injury. A plaintiff still has hurdles to 
overcome, such as restrictive interpretation of “maintain”, the need to show there was 
a danger, because of a failure to maintain, and the injury resulted from that. The 
existence of a statutory duty in New Zealand is much less clear. 
A route to compel repair through the courts remains in Britain today, but is not 
often used. It is now a civil action. The remedy is an order to repair the roads, which 
is perhaps not as useful to an injured plaintiff as damages, except in particular 
circumstances. There have been few cases since 1959. 
Recently, the Infrastructure Act 2015 (UK) created a company, Highways 
England, to take over main highways. This has the promise of redressing the balance 
with rail, since it has safety objectives and is supervised by the same body that 
supervises rail safety, but the evidence so far is not that encouraging, with a lower 
level of safety oversight than for rail. 
In Australia the road regimes are state based. As well as the statutory re-imposition 
of the non-feasance rule, their statutes often protect roading authorities in other ways.  
For example, in New South Wales an act (or omission), to be challenged, has to be so 
unreasonable that no similar authority would consider it reasonable. In Queensland the 
law declares high levels of safety to be incompatible with roading efficiency. 
Victoria on the other hand has sought to impose some responsibilities on roading 
authorities. They have to seek to ensure roads are as safe for users as reasonably 
practicable, and principles as to whether a duty of care has been breached are set out, 
in a list similar to the English one. But there are still restrictions - an authority can still 
shelter behind its policy, resources available must be taken into account, and the same 
unreasonableness test applies there also.  
In Canada, municipalities and the Crown have maintenance obligations for local 
and provincial highways. In Ontario, as an example, the authorities are liable for 
damages for default, although it is a defence that they did not know (objectively) about 
the state of repair, or that they took reasonable steps to prevent default. Policy 
decisions are exempt. 
Rail obligations in all three are similar to those in New Zealand, and as strict. In 
Britain the safety supervision of railways is through the health and safety legislation, 
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and subject to the “reasonably practicable” test and its judicial interpretations. In 
Australia the Model Railway Safety Law also applies the reasonably practicable test 
in the same terms as the health and safety legislation, including the “grossly 
disproportionate” ratio of costs to risks. The model law requires accreditation, 
including a safety management system of wide scope. In Canada a federal law imposes 
similarly extensive rail supervision. 
The rules for railway safety responsibility are consistently strict across the 
jurisdictions, and are similar to those in New Zealand. On the other hand, safety 
obligations on roads in these three countries vary in strictness, from very minimal to 
requiring reasonable care, but do not go beyond an even balancing of care and cost. 
Even so, some obligations go well beyond what is required in New Zealand. 
E The Impact on the Scenarios  
1 Scenario One: a rockfall kills a car or train passenger 
At present, there is no obligation on the roading authority to have carried out pre-
emptive work to prevent such an event. Not doing the work is an omission, and so the 
non-feasance rule would apply. There is no duty that arises from the power to construct 
and maintain roads. It would be highly likely that there is a policy about prioritising 
such work, and cases have held that inspection frequencies can be reasonable, so if the 
authority has an inspection plan and is implementing it, then it may escape liability 
even if misfeasance is argued. The defence of an action simply being “policy” is 
though not part of New Zealand law. If however it was a local road and not a state 
highway, a case could be argued that the LGA s 353 duty has been breached. There is 
no such duty for state highways. Duties for them are merely target obligations. 
Under the HSWA, there may be liability for failure to deal with the risk as far as 
reasonably practicable, but its application is uncertain for roads. A passenger on a non-
work trip would only be covered if the road itself was a workplace, which is debatable. 
Their presence at a point on the road is likely to be too transitory for the authority to 
incur liability. On a work trip, the vehicle is a workplace, and the road it is on could 
also be, but a purposive reading may not support that.  
For rail the same arguments could be made, but at the point of the accident, the 
train will also be a workplace because railway employees are on it. Even though the 
hillside, which may not have been a workplace, was at fault, harm still arose at a 
workplace. Whether or not the passenger was on a work trip does not matter. Then the 
question would be whether everything that was reasonably practicable was done. 
Given the current attention by the regulator to the relatively remote risks of fires in 
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tunnels,9 the railway is likely to be under close scrutiny, and probably liable, for having 
a dangerous bank. In any case the RA eliminates the need to consider the workplace 
question: the question is simply whether the railway had ensured, as far as reasonably 
practicable, that its activities did not cause the death of the passenger. The outcome 
would be the same. 
2 Scenario Two: a person dies because a speed limit is carelessly set. 
 Such a case could be seen as an omission (failure to set the appropriate limit) or 
commission (setting the wrong one). In any case it could be argued that this was not a 
failure to maintain a road, but a failure of some other function like a traffic authority. 
In an extreme case, the road authority might be found negligent. Even if the LGA duty 
on a local authority might apply, it would argue, with substantial judicial support, that 
the road user should have driven to the conditions, and it was his or her responsibility. 
In terms of the HSWA, the arguments about a road not being a workplace would also 
apply. The authority could though be in breach of the Setting of Speed Limits rule. 
Again, on rail such an accident would only occur to a train, with at least a driver, 
a worker. The HSWA would apply; if the person killed was the driver that position 
would be even clearer. The RA would still apply, and since the cost of setting a proper 
speed limit would not be “grossly disproportionate” to the risk, it would be liable. 
Similarly if an accident occurred by simple failure to maintain a speed limit sign on a 
curve. Both elements are covered by the mandatory safety case. 
3 Scenario Three: a vehicle length policy is inappropriate and causes a collision 
While the authority might be negligent, and the act is one of commission, a New 
Zealand court might be convinced that the issue was not justiciable. It might also be 
arguable that this is an omission to set the right length, and thus non-feasance. Again, 
that their functions and powers include making such policies would not found a duty. 
The most likely liability for a road authority would be if the HSWA, s 37(1) applies: 
the policy will be “something arising” from a workplace (office) and would not be 
“without risks” to the safety of someone. More clearly, in terms of the general duty in 
s 36(2) the policy would put someone at risk from “work carried out” by the authority. 
Even more so, since the development of such policy is one of the major products of a 
national roading authority. However, both these sections are subject to the overall 
purpose of the HSWA, which as noted, may not extend to general public safety. 
Property damage is not covered by the HSWA. 
There would be no doubt about the liability of a railway authority under either the 
HSWA or RA. Under the latter, the operator’s safety system should cover major 
                                                          
9 Andrew Hunt (Professional Head Mechanical, KiwiRail Engineering Services), email to Murray King 
on hi-rail vehicle tunnel fire risk (3 February 2016). 
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parameters like vehicle length and clearances. It is unthinkable, given the stringency 
of these requirements, that the system would permit such an error. The system would 
need to be complied with. The RA definition of “reasonably practicable” specifically 
covers property damage, applying the same criteria as for serious injury or death. 
However the duty not to cause property damage is not a duty on the operator or its 
employees, but one on third parties.10 
4 Scenario Four: Differences between a public road, a private road, and a 
railway. 
On a public road a collision might be the result of a failure of the roading authority, 
but the consequences are only likely to be sheeted home in the circumstances above. 
In particular, the non-feasance rule applies to public roads. 
On a private road the non-feasance rule does not apply, so the likelihood of a 
successful suit is greater. The liability would be as an occupier, since there is no right 
of access to diffuse the responsibility. However, a private road’s purpose might need 
to be examined. A major private road (such as in a forest) exists only for work 
purposes. A collision on that road might be more clearly subject to the HSWA, since 
its only function is as a workplace. Moreover, so will the vehicle be a workplace.11 
The arguments about not covering public safety have no weight, since it is private 
situation. Thus the road owner could be subject to the “reasonably practicable” test. A 
private road that the public customarily have access to (such as access to a ferry 
terminal) might be considered more akin to a public road.12 
Of course Berryman13 involved a farm road and bridge, both private with no access 
as of right. The deceased was an independent worker who was permitted to be there, 
not an employee. That case found no liability, but under subsequent HSEA 
amendments and the HSWA it is likely that the farm owner would be liable, even if a 
public road owner was not.  
On the railway ordinary negligence principles would apply. There is no protection 
for non-feasance for a railway, even for a road owned by it. As noted above, the 
HSWA and the RA would apply with full force, whether the railway was publicly or 
privately owned. 
                                                          
10 Railways Act 2005, s 9. Regulatory action can also take property damage into account – ss 24 and 28 
for example [RA]. 
11 Leaving aside trespassers. 
12 Bugge v Taylor [1941] 1 KB 198 (KB); Land Transport (Road User) Rule 2004, r 1.6, definition of 
“road” includes (e) “a place to which the public have access, whether as of right or not”. 
13 Above n 8. 
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IV Proposed reforms  
A Overview 
This chapter so far has summarised the differential treatment of road and rail. To 
balance the safety treatment of road and rail, there will need to be legislation, both to 
counter established jurisprudence, and to change some current legislative positions. 
The changes could be quite minor (although not in impact) or more extensive. This 
part sets out some options. 
Making road and rail obligations more equal could be achieved either by reducing 
rail’s obligations or by increasing road’s. Both are considered below, but a reduction 
in safety standards on any mode is unlikely to be tolerated, so the likely changes would 
involve increasing road’s obligations. This rather neatly illustrates the point of the 
dissertation, that rail is treated more severely, and that there is a gap in road’s safety 
coverage.  
B Reducing Rail’s Safety Obligations. 
The focus on road and rail in this dissertation has been on the infrastructure and not 
on the operations. Thus any reduction in the safety obligation of rail to match road’s 
would need to be confined to infrastructure. 
1 Limiting the application of health and safety laws on “workplace” 
One option is to reduce rail’s HSWA (and RA) obligations to situations where actual 
work on the infrastructure is going on. This is akin to the farmer’s defence in s 37(3), 
that the general duty to third parties in s 37(1) does not apply to farms (apart from 
buildings) “unless work is being carried out at the time”.14  
Section 37(3) does however not specify that it must be farming work (nor the 
farmer’s work) that is being carried out, so other work (such as forestry) not carried 
out by the farmer may mean the farmer is caught, on the reasoning in Berryman.15 
That case said it did not have to be the property owner’s (or occupier’s) work; that 
person could be liable when the place is made a workplace by some other party’s 
work.16 The wording is different in the HSWA, but still puts a duty on a person who 
“manages or controls”17 a workplace, so the argument is still likely to apply. 
                                                          
14 Section 37(3)(b)(ii)). 
15 Above n 8, at 131. 
16 See Chapter Four. 
17 HSWA 2015, s 37(1). 
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To make the clause work in terms of rail infrastructure, it would need to reduce 
obligations to those sites where actual infrastructure work (as opposed for example to 
driving trains) is being carried out.18 A new subsection could be added to section 37. 
(4) For the purposes of subsection (1), if the PCBU is conducting a rail 
infrastructure business or undertaking, the duty owed by the PCBU under that 
subsection applies only to a part of that infrastructure when infrastructure work 
is being carried out on that part at the time. 
For the avoidance of doubt, a similar subsection could be included to apply to road 
in the same terms. This would cover the situation of the presence of a work vehicle of 
any sort turning the road itself into a workplace with respect to the roading authority. 
However, even if the HSWA did not apply to railway infrastructure, the railway 
infrastructure operator would still be caught by the RA imposing similar duties. It 
would be difficult and potentially inconsistent with the scheme of the HSWA to single 
out infrastructure operators in a general way, but the next section proposes one 
possible specific change. 
2 Reducing the “grossly disproportionate” ratio of costs to benefits. 
The “grossly disproportionate” cost standard in HSWA, s 22(e) applies to rail, both 
through the HSWA and the RA,19 On the other hand, the standard adopted for roading 
works and maintenance is a reasonable cost one, where benefits are expected to exceed 
costs, or in the terms used in the HSWA, benefits are at least proportionate with the 
costs.  
One potential option to bring rail on to the same footing as road is to delete 
“grossly” from paragraph (e) – so it simply reads “disproportionate”, or even “whether 
the cost is proportionate to the risks”. Going further, the section would still work if it 
stopped at “minimising the risk”, leaving the ratio of costs and risks unstated, but 
implicitly in balance. Another option would be to revise paragraph (e) so it simply 
referred to “whether the costs of eliminating or avoiding the risks are reasonable”. 
What is reasonable in terms of costs could be defined as it once was in the Land 
Transport Act 1998.20 Either way, that would place road and rail on an even footing. 
To be consistent, a change would need to be limited to rail infrastructure, so that 
operations continued to be treated like any other industry, including operation of road 
vehicles in a work situation. It would be difficult to do this in a neat way in the HSWA, 
which creates general rather than industry-specific law,  but it could be done in the 
RA, by leaving s 5 unchanged, including “grossly disproportionate”, apart from adding 
an extra subsection: 
                                                          
18 RA, s 4 already defines “railway infrastructure”. 
19 Section 5, as amended by HSWA , Schedule 5. 
20 Section 189(2), as originally enacted. 
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(f) In the case of work involving railway infrastructure, subsection (e) is to be 
read as if the word “grossly” had been deleted. 
Rather than single out railway infrastructure in the HSWA, s 35 of that Act could 
then be prayed in aid of avoiding the application of “grossly disproportionate” to rail 
infrastructure cases. Section 35 provides for a person or court to take account of the 
provisions of other laws in determining compliance with the Act. That nevertheless 
may not be sufficient as the section is phrased in terms of determining whether a duty 
under the Act has been complied with, not whether such a duty needs to be complied 
with. 
Using “grossly disproportionate” is a distortion that affects the whole of workplace 
safety, biasing expenditure towards that use compared with other uses. It would be 
logical to address this, and doing so would help balance the obligations of road and 
rail without the difficulties identified above. But changing the health and safety 
legislation for all industries is not the point of this dissertation. 
Changing the law to reduce rail’s obligations may be difficult. And, apart from 
amending “grossly disproportionate” in general, a lessening of rail’s safety oversight 
is not an easy case to advocate, nor one that on balance would be in society’s interests. 
These changes may not be possible to achieve. 
C Increasing Road’s Obligations 
What this dissertation is dealing with is the relative burden of compliance on road and 
rail. Thus an increase in road’s safety obligations is also an option. 
1 Make duty on local road owners apply to state highways. 
The LGA, s 353 imposes safety obligations on local authorities. The provision 
applying s 353 to NZTA covers rights and powers, but not duties. The simplest way 
of improving road’s obligations would be to make the duties in s 353 apply to state 
highways. 
To do this without impacting on a number of other sections mentioned in s 61 of 
the Government Roading Powers Act (GRPA) requires some redrafting. Leaving s 353 
in the existing list of rights and powers in s 61, and specifying its duties in another 
subsection, would be the least disruptive change:21 
(2AA) The duty in section 353 of the Local Government Act 1974 to take all 
sufficient precautions for the safety of the public, traffic, and road workers also 
applies to the Agency. 
                                                          
21 The existing subs (2A) determines this numbering, as the new subsection should follow immediately 
after subs (2). 
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2 A broader “reasonable care” obligation.  
But this duty is rather generally worded, and the dearth of cases on it suggest it is not 
very effective as a duty. So a stronger formulation could be considered, making it a 
duty to use reasonable care to ensure the roads are safe. 
This would be the position if the non-feasance rule did not apply in New Zealand.22 
As discussed in Chapter Two, it is probable that the rule does still apply here. 
Examples of legislation applying “reasonable care” can be drawn from English, 
Victorian, and Canadian statutes. The example given here is based on the Highways 
Act 1980 (UK), ss 41 and 58; but it has been adapted to overcome the historical 
restrictions imposed by the jurisprudence on road maintenance. It is also adapted by 
using the “reasonably practicable” test, following modern New Zealand practice, 
rather than the “steps that are reasonably required” in the United Kingdom Act. Case 
law in England suggests that their test is less stringent that “so far as reasonably 
practicable”.23 
It would be possible to simply abolish the non-feasance rule, but that would not 
overcome the historical restrictions, as the English and Australian jurisprudence would 
still be called upon by road authorities. It should nevertheless be done. The restrictions 
can be overcome by an inclusive definition of road.  
Much of the English jurisprudence (and some of New Zealand’s) concern 
footpaths because they meet the definition of highway. The proposed definition is of 
“road” rather than “highway”; footpaths do not impact on the road: rail imbalance, and 
with accident compensation, they should not need to be covered to provide personal 
injury relief.  
A new section should be inserted in the GRPA:24 
       60A Duty to maintain highways 
(1) The rule of law exempting the Agency from liability for non-repair of highways 
is hereby abrogated.25 
(2) The Agency is under a duty to maintain all roads under its control.26  
(3) To discharge this duty, the Agency shall as far as is reasonably practicable, 
ensure the roads are not dangerous for traffic.27 
(4) An action may be taken against the Agency in respect of damage resulting from 
its failure to maintain the road. 
                                                          
22 Brodie, above n 3.  
23 Pridham v Hemel Hempstead Corporation (1970) 69 LGR 523 (CA). 
24 Footnotes within proposed legislation are for clarification and not intended to be part of the 
legislation. 
25 Compare Highways (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1961 (UK) 9 & 10 Eliz II c 63, s 1(1) 
26 Compare Highways Act 1980 (UK) s 41(1) [UKHA]. 
27 Compare UKHA s 58(1). 
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(5) Maintain includes repair and inspection. 
(6) Road for the purposes of the duty to maintain includes: 
(a) The surface of the road; 
(b) Material, fixed or loose, on the surface of the road; 
(c) The structure, fabric and formation of the road; 
(d) Works designed protect the road, including walls and drains; 
(e) Works designed to protect road users, including barriers between lanes and 
on the edges of the road; 
              (f)  Warnings, markings, signs, and signals; 
              (g) Vegetation encroaching on the carriageway or interfering with safety of 
road users; 
 (h)  A bridge or ford which a road crosses; 
 (i)   A tunnel which a road goes through; and 
   (h)  A cycleway: but 
   (i)  does not include  
  (i)  a footpath; or 
                  (ii)  any road that the public does not have access to as of right. 
As in England and Wales and Victoria,28 some guidance should be given about the 
standard and level of maintenance:29 
60B Matters taken into account in determining whether the duty has been 
discharged 
(1) In determining whether the duty to maintain in section 60A has been 
discharged, the Agency and the court shall in particular have regard to the 
following matters: 
(a) The character of the road, and the traffic that could reasonably be 
expected to use it. 
(b) The standard of maintenance appropriate for a road of that character and 
used by such traffic. 
(c) The state of repair in which a reasonable person would expect to find the 
road. 
(d) Whether the Agency knew, or could reasonably have been expected to 
know, that the condition of the road was likely to cause danger to users 
of the road. 
                                                          
28 See Chapter Three. 
29 Compare UKHA s 58(2); Road Management Act 2004 (Vic), s 101. 
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(e) Where the Agency could not reasonably have repaired the road or taken 
other preventative measures before a particular incident, what warning 
notices of its condition had been displayed. 
Similar sections should replace s 353 of the LGA. Section 353 would have the 
content of s 60A, above. The existing subsections of s 353 should be retained as a new 
s 353A on particular safety duties round road works. Section 60B would become s 
353B. 
3 Make health and safety legislation apply to roads 
The health and safety legislation is where safety rules have the most impact in New 
Zealand, rather than in general tortious duties, given the accident compensation regime 
and inability to sue for personal injury. If it is good enough for rail and all other 
undertakings to meet the “reasonably practicable” test, then should be good enough 
for road. Then we would have a common standard for safety legislation. 
 It is clear that the HSWA applies to rail, and it also applies to road vehicles. As 
discussed in Chapter Four, it is less clear that the provision of roads comes within the 
Act.  
One way of addressing this problem is to include a section directly declaring roads 
to be covered by the HSWA. There are precedents for such a provision, in HSWA ss 
9 (aircraft) and 10 (ships). A similar approach to s 10 could be taken for roads, simply 
declaring that the Act applies to roads, whether or not the work is actually taking place 
at the time (see discussion on s 20, below): 
9A Application of Act to roads and other infrastructure 
(1) This Act applies to roads, whether or not work is currently taking place on 
the road. 
(2) Roads includes bridges and tunnels the road crosses or goes through; and 
all ancillary works and equipment such as signs and signals. 
(3) This Act does not apply to drivers and owners of vehicles on a road when 
the vehicle is not being used for work. 
 The section could cover wider infrastructure than roads, along the lines of the 
amendments proposed below to s 20(1)(c) of the 2015 Act. It may be that that 
paragraph would not then be necessary, but leaving the present tense wording of s 20 
untrammeled would invite later argument about the contradiction between the two. 
For the avoidance of doubt, both should remain, or at least s 20(1)(c) made subject to 
s 9A. 
A further issue is the definition of workplace, which has a present tense emphasis, 
with its use of “is being carried out”. A road will be a workplace for someone working 
on it, including a driver or occupant of a vehicle engaged on work activities.  This may 
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well make it a workplace in itself, but it would be better to make it clear (and as well 
protect the non-work users). The simplest way to address these issues would be to 
define a road as a workplace with respect to the road controlling authority. Adding a 
paragraph (c) to subsection (2), which already lists places that are included as 
workplaces, would be deceptively simple. But in doing that the road would still be 
subject to the language in subsection (1), which defines workplace in the present, 
where work is actually going on. 
Changing the definition for all parties is unlikely to be acceptable. But there is a 
class of place where work can create hazards some time after the work has taken place, 
and their users deserve the HSWA’s protection. In these cases the interval between the 
work creating the danger and its crystallisation into an accident may be too long to be 
characterised in the present tense terms used in s 20. It could be months or even years. 
Thus a new subsection (c) to section 20(1) should be included to apply to roads: 
(c) includes a road, road bridge or road tunnel, even if work is not currently taking 
place there. 
Potentially it could apply to all such places: 
(c) includes a road, bridge, wharf, tunnel, railway, runway, taxiway, electricity 
transmission line, pipeline or similar infrastructure, even if work is not currently 
taking place there. 
The concept of such a place (and the doubt over its status) has been recognised in 
the farming exemption in s 37, discussed above. A farm was potentially a workplace 
at times outside those where work was taking place. The amendment made it clear it 
was not a workplace in those circumstances. Equally the position with infrastructure 
can be clarified, in the opposite way. The motivations for the farming change are 
unlikely to apply to infrastructure.30 
If this is done, then road and rail would be on an equal footing.  
4 Dealing with the “public safety” obligation 
One of the aspects that sets rail and road apart from the bulk of workplaces is the 
presence of a “public safety” obligation, that is an obligation to people who use their 
infrastructure or are in the vicinity of it, but are not workers there, and who may be 
exposed to risk from the activities. Since the HSWA is arguably not intended to be a 
“public safety” statute, these activities may be outside its scope.31 The distinction is 
doubtful in the case of rail, since the obligations to protect others at or near a workplace 
will only crystallise when work (such as driving a train) is actually going on (and so 
                                                          
30 The changes were in response to farmers not wanting to be responsible for accidents to walkers using 
their land – Health and Safety Reform Bill 2014 (192-2), as reported from the Transport and Industrial 
Relations Committee (commentary) at 8. 
31 See Chapter Four. 
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public safety is covered by the presence of work), but it is clearer in the case of road 
unless the amendment suggested in the previous section is made.  
In Britain this has been recognised with respect to rail, and the Railways Act 1993 
(UK), s 117, provides for all safety oversight to be done through their Health and 
Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. It is a brief provision and the process of including public 
safety coverage is simple. Certain statutory provisions about rail safety are deemed to 
be within the coverage of and enforced through the Health and Safety at Work etc. 
Act, including provisions about construction of railways and rail vehicles and the 
protection of the general public. The purposes of that Act are expanded to cover 
construction and:32 
(2)(b) protecting the public (whether passengers or not) from personal injury and 
other risks arising from the construction and operation of transport systems to 
which this section applies. 
Such an approach could be taken for road here, to simply say that the public safety 
aspects of road operation are covered by the HSWA. The amendment already 
suggested to s 20 may suffice, along with simply including the HSWA’s purpose 
statement a paragraph that covers construction of infrastructure assets, and protecting 
the public. Section 3(1) of the HSWA could be amended by adding after paragraph 
(a): 
(aa) protecting the public from personal injury and other risks arising from the 
construction, maintenance and operation of transport and other infrastructure 
activities. 
This would need a definition of “infrastructure assets”, along the same lines as the 
s 20(1)(c) amendment. It would also cover rail, but not vehicles, which in both road 
and rail are operational assets and reasonably equally covered now.  
5 A special Act to cover roading obligations 
Another approach would be to take the model for other dangerous activities (like gas, 
electricity, and railways) and create specific health and safety obligations in a Roading 
Act. In the RA, s 5 defines “reasonably practicable” in exactly the same terms as s 22 
of the HSWA, apart from the introductory words that tailor the section to rail; and 
extend its coverage to include property damage. Section 7 sets out the duties of a rail 
participant, which are similar to those in the HSWA, with the important difference that 
they do not confine the duties to a workplace, but rather relate them to the rail activities 
per se. Section 8 makes it clear that the HSWA still applies. 
Applying these to roading, the first clauses in an Act could read: 
                                                          
32 Railways Act 1993 (UK) s 117(2)(b). 
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1 Title  
This Act is the Roading Act 2016. 
2 Commencement – [allow a long lead in for adjustment, say a year.33] 
3     Meaning of reasonably practicable  
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, reasonably practicable, 
in relation to a duty to ensure health and safety or to protect property, means 
that which is, or was, at a particular time, reasonably able to be done in 
relation to ensuring health and safety or the protection of property, taking 
into account and weighing up all relevant matters, including [paragraphs (a) 
to (e) from HSWA, s 22].34 
4  Interpretation 
Road has the meaning given to it in the Local Government Act 1974, section 
315, except that it includes a motorway and a private road; and also includes 
[elements set out for s 60A, GRPA, above]. 
Road controlling authority means a regional or territorial local authority, 
the New Zealand Transport Agency, or any other person in charge of a road 
to which the public have access as of right. 
5 General safety duties of road controlling authorities and persons 
working for them35 
(1) A road controlling authority must ensure, so far as is reasonably 
practicable, that none of the roading activities for which it is responsible 
causes, or is likely to cause, the death of, or serious injury to individuals. 
(2) No road controlling authority or persons working for it may do or omit 
to do anything in respect of roading infrastructure if he or she knows or 
reasonably ought to know that act or omission will cause, or will be likely 
to cause the death of, or serious injury to, individuals. 
6 Relationship with Act to Health and Safety at Work Act 201536 
Nothing in this Act limits the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015. 
7  General safety duties of other persons37 
(1) Every person on or near a road, other than a driver of a non-work vehicle, 
commits an offence who fails to ensure, so far as reasonably practicable, 
that no individual dies or is seriously injured, and that no property is 
significantly damaged, as a result or any act or omission of that person. 
                                                          
33 The Highways (Miscellaneous Provisions Act 1961 (UK), above n 14, which abrogated the non-
feasance rule, did not come into force for three years after it was passed. 
34 Compare RA, s 5. 
35 Compare RA, s 7. 
36 Compare RA, s 8. 
37 Compare RA, s 9. 
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(2) [specific prohibitions on interfering with or damaging a road transferred 
from other legislation]. 
These sections could be part of both the GRPA and the LGA, in a new part of each 
headed “Duties of road controlling authorities”,38 instead of a new, stand-alone, 
Roading Act. 
D Supervision of Safety Performance 
Adding serious safety duties to roading authorities calls into question the current self-
regulation of the NZTA and local bodies with respect to roading. It would be 
inappropriate for them to be judges of their own performance, let alone making 
decisions on requiring improvement or even on prosecution. It would also be 
anomalous for the country’s primary roading agency, NZTA, to continue to be the rail 
safety regulator. For those aspects governed by the HSWA, WorkSafe, a division of 
the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, would have that oversight. 
But the proposed reforms include duties beyond the health and safety legislation. 
These also need oversight. As well, given the specialist nature of road and rail safety, 
the health and safety oversight could be devolved to an independent body, as is done 
in Britain through the Office of Road and Rail. A new body, recreating the rail 
oversight functions of the former Land Transport New Zealand, along with new road 
oversight powers, could be created to provide the oversight.  
V Final Comment 
In New Zealand and other jurisdictions, rail safety is closely controlled, including 
the safety of the infrastructure - the track, formation, and structures. For roads, on the 
other hand, there is much less supervision of the actual road, its construction and 
condition. Safety is the responsibility of the user, not the provider, except in general 
terms. For example, in the scenarios above, the road owner is unlikely to face civil or 
regulatory action. If the same event happened on rail, then at least regulatory action, 
involving penalties, is likely. The result is that rail has to go to much greater lengths, 
and expenditure, to ensure it complies. 
This chapter has presented a spectrum of reforms that would bring road’s 
obligations in line with rail’s. While these could include reducing rail’s obligations, 
such measures are unlikely to be acceptable, so adding to road’s obligations is the 
appropriate way to proceed. This should have the added benefit of better safety 
performance by road, reducing death and injury. 
                                                          
38 The GRPA may need to be renamed to reflect the inclusion of substantial duties, for example to “The 
Government Roading Act” 
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There are a number of ways this could be done, with greater or lesser change from 
the status quo. On balance, giving roading authorities an enforceable duty to maintain 
roads safely, and extending the coverage of the health and safety legislation to 
infrastructure assets where work might only take place infrequently, would achieve a 
worthwhile change with limited legislative amendment. 
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